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Kurdish-Islamic synthesis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Kurdish-Islamic synthesis,[1][2] or Kurdish-Islamic nationalism (Sorani: کوردایەتیی ئیسلامی; Kurmanji: Kurdayetîya Îslamî), is a form of Kurdish nationalism which is Islamist in nature, unlike mainstream Kurdish nationalism, which is secularist in nature.[3][4]

History

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The ideology emerged after the abolition of the Caliphate and the creation of Turkey, which angered many Kurds, who felt that their culture, religion, language, and people were endangered because of Atatürk's reforms.[5] The ideology was also reactionary to the Turkish–Islamic synthesis which emerged during the late Ottoman Empire, as "the Kurdish religious leaders became aware that the Turks had used Islamic symbols and sentiments in favour of their nationalist aims, so they tried to do the same".[6][7]

The ideology was mainly associated with Sheikh Said. Another ideologue is Mullah Krekar. In some videos, Mullah Krekar speaks about Kurdish issues and supporting Kurdish independence. He was described as "publishing political and nationalistic statements one day, and Jihadi statements on the next". Mullah Krekar is also a populist, and his popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan rose between 2017 and 2019, mainly among the youth who were against the Kurdish government. Mullah Krekar also added that secularism "has destroyed Kurdish values".[8]

The Shafi'i school was praised for its role in the preservation of Kurdish culture, especially language. The KTTC claimed that if Kurds lost their language, they would lose the Shafi'i school and their ethnicity after.[9] Early Kurdish movements during the Ottoman Empire campaigned for official status for both the Kurdish language and the Shafi'i school.[10] The Hanafi school was the official sect of the Ottoman Empire and was publicly encouraged by the government. Kurdistan was a predominantly Shafi'i region surrounded by different sects and religions. Adherence to the Shafi'i school was societally seen as essential to Kurdish identity.[11][9] When Turkish nationalists realised the role of the Shafi'i school in Kurdish society, they attempted to spread the Hanafi school to Kurds in hopes that it leads them into adopting a Turkish identity as well.[12]

In the 1980s, many Kurdish students at İmam Hatip schools "increasingly emphasised their Kurdish identity in opposition to the Turkish military operations". The relations between secular Kurds and Islamist Kurds quickly went from extremely tense to "quite cordial". Many Islamist Kurds began adopting nationalism, while many secular Kurds, including the PKK, had "given up their earlier arrogant attitude toward Islam" after the newfound unity with the Islamists.[13]

The synthesis grew during the split between Kurdish and Turkish Islamists, as the Kurds accused the Turks continuing the nationalist and assimilationist policies of the state even during Islamist discourse, and using the topic of Islamic fraternity while simultaneously attempting to assimilate Kurds by using religion. Kurdish Islamists increasingly left Turkish Islamist circles.[14]

Kurdish-Islamic nationalism is often hostile to other nationalisms in the region, and is also against Secularism, Kemalism, and Ba'athism.[15][3]

Criticism

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Many of the Kurdistan Islamic Union's politicians, including their leader Salahaddin Bahaaddin, have criticized the ideology, saying that "This is a huge heresy", "Islam can not be nationalized", and that "There is only one Islam, the Islam of Allah."[16]

In 2013, Altan Tan claimed that the "Kurdish-Islamic synthesis" was an excuse made by Turkish–Islamic synthesists to justify them "using Islam to paint their own empire and hegemony."[17]

Organizations

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Iran
Iraq
Syria
Turkey

Notable figures

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Secular Turks fear Kurdish–Islamic synthesis after presidentials". Hürriyet Daily News. 16 July 2014. Retrieved 2022-08-12.
  2. ^ "Türk İslâm sentezinden Kürt İslâm sentezine - Yeni Akit". www.yeniakit.com.tr (in Turkish). Retrieved 2022-08-12.
  3. ^ a b Övet, Kerem; Hewitt, James; Abbas, Tahir (February 23, 2022). "Understanding PKK, Kurdish Hezbollah and ISIS Recruitment in Southeastern Turkey". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: 1–21. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2022.2042897. hdl:1887/3618301. S2CID 247117013.
  4. ^ "Islamists of Kurdistan: Contradictions Between Identity and Freedom". The Washington Institute.
  5. ^ Hassan, Mona (10 January 2017). Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-8371-4.
  6. ^ Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 35
  7. ^ Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 32-33
  8. ^ Mahmud Yasin Kurdi (29 September 2016). "Time has come to break from Iraq, says radical Kurdish cleric Mulla Krekar". rudaw.net. Archived from the original on 29 November 2016. Retrieved 28 November 2016.
  9. ^ a b Kurdish Identity, Islamism, and Ottomanism: The Making of a Nation in Kurdish Journalistic Discourse (1898-1914), Deniz Ekici, 2021, pp. 113
  10. ^ A Modern History of the Kurds, David McDowall, 2021, pp. 114
  11. ^ Kurds and Their Struggle for Autonomy: Enduring Identity and Clientelism, Mehran Tamadonfar, Roman Lewis, 2024, pp. 74
  12. ^ Zilan Dosyası (Ağrı Kürt İsyanının Bilinmeyenleri) 1 Cilt, 2015, pp. 153
  13. ^ Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey, Paul J White, 2000, pp. 38-39
  14. ^ The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader: Criticism, Opposition and Dissent, 2016, pp. 209-210
  15. ^ "Islamists of Kurdistan: Contradictions Between Identity and Freedom". The Washington Institute.
  16. ^ Gade, Tine; Palani, Kamaran (22 May 2022). "The hybridisation of religion and nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan: The case of Kurdish Islam". Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 5 (3–6): 221–241. doi:10.1080/23802014.2022.2070269. hdl:11250/2999460. S2CID 249036504.
  17. ^ "Altan Tan: Kürt-İslam sentezi zehirdir, ben şeriatçıyım". T24 (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-12-22.
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