Albertism (Argentina)
Albertism refers to the group of leaders who follow, are driven, and are protected by Alberto Fernández.[1] It forms a faction within Peronism and the political coalition Unión por la Patria (formerly Frente de Todos),[2] and tends to maintain a centrist position, contrasting with the left-wing populism promoted by Kirchnerism.[3]
Albertism Albertismo | |
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Leader | Alberto Fernández |
Split from | Kirchnerism |
Think tank | Callao Group |
Membership | Justicialist Party (sectors) and Labor and Equality Party |
Ideology | Federal Peronism[4] Progressive liberalism[5] Syncretism[2] |
Political position | Centre[6] |
National affiliation | Frente de Todos (2019-2023) Unión por la Patria (since 2023) |
Development
[edit]Formation
[edit]Albertism begins to take shape during the 2019 Argentine presidential elections, facing several challenges and contradictory demands. After the end of Mauricio Macri's presidency, Argentina faces social, business, and political tensions. While social movements demand more state assistance and protection, business sectors call for market-friendly reforms. At the same time, some propose reactivating the economy through increases in wages and pensions, which could jeopardize the viability of small and medium enterprises.[7]
Fernández's government also has to deal with the IMF program, which limits economic policy options. Additionally, Fernández's cabinet faces the need to balance internal differences within his coalition, deciding whether to create an autonomous cabinet or include representatives from all sectors.[8] Simultaneously, Fernández expresses his discontent with the judiciary, especially with federal judges, in the context of corruption cases linked to the outgoing government.[7]
Internationally, relations with Brazil and the transition to a government with a weakened economy present other key challenges.[7]
In this turbulent period of building Albertism, Fernández made a trip to Córdoba to meet with the Mediterranean Foundation in an event that included prominent figures from the country's business community. This meeting was interpreted as a clear signal of his willingness to engage with more orthodox sectors aligned with economic liberalism. This suggests that, before his interaction with Guzmán, Fernández showed an inclination towards an approach that sought to connect with traditional economic power sectors. The advice of economists like Martín Redrado also had a significant impact on the initial construction of an orthodox economic program.[9]
Albertismo as government
[edit]Alberto Fernández assumed the presidency of the Nation on December 10, 2019, but the new coalition government experiment did not fully develop. Unexpectedly, the arrival of COVID-19 interrupted the political landscape and ended the dispersion, giving Fernández his moment of greatest consensus and centrality. The Argentine president declared a strict quarantine on March 20, 2020. The catastrophe, visible in several parts of the world, and the excessive belief that, with a not-too-long lockdown, we could fight the virus, validated the stance of "health over the economy." It was a fleeting moment of national unity. Fernández relied, to his right, on Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, and to his left, on Axel Kicillof. These were times when those around the president believed everything was under control and his approval ratings were high.[10]
However, in a short time, this process was frustrated. The center was blown apart, but the most significant were the internal discussions within the coalition government, particularly between Albertismo and Kirchnerism. The opposition, for its part, was reluctant to compromise. Each resolution was reviewed, declineable, and always had to be postponed. In the country of decision-making leaders, Fernández became the president of permanent doubt. The most notable indecision was the failed expropriation of the Vicentin cereal company. Fernández had announced that the governor of Santa Fe, Omar Perotti, would bring forward a superior proposal.[10]
Throughout this process, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s interventions were key, from the "Zaiat incident" — the post on her social media of an article by journalist Alfredo Zaiat, implicitly critical of Fernández — to her letters at a distance and the numerous resignations of Kirchnerist ministers after the defeat in the legislative primaries. The chaotic rhythm of the coalition was also marked by the resignation of Máximo Kirchner as leader of the ruling bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, in rejection of the initial agreement with the IMF.[10]
In this context, scandals such as the “VIP vaccination scandal,” which referred to the application of COVID-19 vaccines to people who should not have received them yet, at the Ministry of Health of Argentina, emerged. This was followed by the leaks of images from the birthday party of the president’s wife, Fabiola Yáñez, in Olivos, when the prohibition of such events was in place.[10]
As for achievements, the government managed to revive the bill on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy, which was approved and fulfilled a historic demand from the feminist women’s movement. This victory remained vital after the 2018 rejection. Access to legal abortion, until early 2022, reduced deaths from illegal abortions to zero. However, neither the pandemic nor the conquest of the legal abortion right — for a large part of the population, including its electorate — served to justify the "economic" issue.[10]
Martín Guzmán, an economist who survived the 2001 crisis, who had presented a paper titled "Sovereign Debt Crisis: Will It Be Different This Time?" in which he advocated suspending the payment of capital and interest and avoiding new loans from the International Monetary Fund, would ultimately be chosen to occupy the position of economy minister. With a post-doctorate from the University of British Columbia, he initially showed discontent with Fernández's orthodox plans. The confrontation with Wall Street and the need to negotiate a debt restructuring led the Argentine government to a difficult position. Guzmán argued that greater confrontations with creditors could result in even more complicated problems and proposed an evidence-based approach that had failed in the past. This led to a fiscal adjustment approach through the Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation Law, which included cuts and restrictions on public spending,[9] continuing under the euphemism of “calming the economy” (a term repeated by Minister Martín Guzmán), in response to the demands of the IMF and external creditors. Serious reports, such as the one released by the CIFRA center of the CTA, showed that nominal wages were 5.3% below inflation in the first year of Fernández's government. Wages increased by 33.2% between January 2020 and the same month of 2021, while the consumer price index had risen by 38.5%. Food and beverage prices increased by 42.3%. Furthermore, the report revealed the destruction of businesses, the employment crisis, and the moderation of economic policy, which included a sharp reduction in primary spending, except for energy subsidies.[10]
Officials appointed by the government itself, such as the director of Banco Nación, Claudio Lozano, criticized the new pension formula. Lozano pointed out that it was designed with the IMF in mind, prioritizing the maintenance of fiscal accounts over the purchasing power of retirees. The figures also reflected higher revenue, thanks to rising prices due to inflation, and a dilution of social spending. Cuts in the Emergency Family Income occurred just as one of the many COVID-19 resurgences began. For example, pensions fell by 6% in real terms in 2021, losing all that was recovered in 2020 and even regressing to levels below 2019. Compared to 2015, the accumulated drop was 23%.[10]
As a result, the Frente de Todos coalition came second and was defeated by the center-right coalition Juntos por el Cambio in the 2021 legislative elections. Cristina Kirchner herself distanced herself from Albertismo and pointed out the mistakes of the government: “I also pointed out that I believed an incorrect fiscal adjustment policy was being carried out − the vice president wrote in a public letter in September 2021 after the primary election defeat −. And she claimed that [the adjustment] “was negatively impacting economic activity and, therefore, society as a whole, and that, undoubtedly, this would have electoral consequences. I didn’t say it once… I got tired of saying it… and not only to the President of the Nation. The response was always that it wasn’t so, that I was wrong, and that according to the polls, we would win the elections ‘very well.’” Although, according to some experts like Guillermo Calvo, an Argentine economist and academic at Columbia University, interviewed by the Chilean newspaper Diario Financiero before the government assumed office, he considered that “Cristina is the best thing that can happen to the country” because “she will apply the adjustment with popular support, blaming the previous ruler.”[10]
Weakening
[edit]In 2022, the situation of Albertismo began to weaken. The then Minister of Justice, Marcela Losardo, submitted her resignation. A few days earlier, in the opening of the Legislative Sessions, the president announced a judicial agenda in which he proposed profound reforms in the Federal Judiciary. The judicial agenda of the Senate president also caused Losardo to distance herself from the government.[11]
At the event shared with the president after more than three months without seeing each other, Vice President Cristina Kirchner referred (without naming it) to the company Techint, which is in charge of the civil works for the Néstor Kirchner gas pipeline. “Boys [Techint], we can’t give you 200 million dollars to pay for the sheet metal you manufacture in a subsidiary in Brazil. Bring the sheet metal from Brazil and make it here in an Argentine production line. If you’ve made fortunes here. The balance in 2021 tripled that of 2020.” She was also critical of the economic management of the Frente de Todos, and asked the president to “use the pen.”[12]
After the event, in radio statements, Matías Kulfas, Minister of Productive Development of Argentina, defended the government’s economic management and said: “We have no friends in the business sector. The government sits down to discuss.” He added: “The pen is with the president.” He also referred to the gas pipeline issue and distanced himself from any responsibility: “IEASA is the company that does the bidding and sets the conditions for this to happen.” He would later indicate in an off-the-record statement that officials from the then-IEASA “set up a bidding document tailored for Techint.” And that, in any case, they were the ones who “didn’t use the pen as they should,” which led to his resignation, and Fernández’s support for the former vice president.[12]
Martín Guzmán followed with a surprising resignation. The former economy minister did so from his Twitter account while Cristina Kirchner was giving a speech criticizing — among other things — his strategy. The pressure on Guzmán had intensified both from the market and from the hardline wing of Kirchnerism.[11]
The departure of former Secretary for Strategic Affairs Gustavo Beliz and the arrival of Sergio Massa as superminister (the ministries of Economy, Productive Development, and Agriculture would be merged), left Albertismo. The "Albertism" in the Cabinet became weakened, as few were the officials from President Alberto Fernández's inner circle.[11]
Current Situation
[edit]For the 2023 presidential elections in Argentina, Albertism, initially aligned with Alberto Fernández, began to distance itself. After stepping down from the candidacy,[13] he decided to align himself behind the center-right Daniel Scioli,[14] moving the political scenario to the right. Eventually, he withdrew from his candidacy to support Sergio Massa, who would be accompanied by the Albertist Agustín Rossi.[15]
Doctrine
[edit]Albertism holds a centrist position[6] and has a transversal ideological orientation[2] close to both liberalism and progressivism,[5] situated within Peronism, more specifically the Federal Peronism or non-K.[4]
Albertism advocates an "anti-grieta" and pragmatic discourse (which Fernández presented from the beginning of his political career)[16], emphasizing the power of “consensus” and the significant presence of the State, which they believe promotes the formation of dialogues and orientations for the common good. It is supported by alfonsinistas, kirchneristas, cafieristas, and also duhaldistas, depending on the circumstances. The kirchnerist reference is the least present but appears at specific points.[17]
Albertism places the State as the coach who rescues, designs, and plans strategies. The State is established through its presence, its direct reference during crises, and as the preferred companion of the population, positioning itself as the essential backbone for prevention and social containment.[17]
While the defense of the state's presence in social emergency issues is an element of Albertism, on economic issues, the differences with Kirchnerism and statism are more intense. The agreement with the International Monetary Fund was seen by much of Kirchnerism as a betrayal of redistributive electoral promises and became a source of constant internal tension within the Frente de Todos. In "Albertism," those seeking closer ties with Washington predominate. On controversial international issues, they also show disagreements with the Cristinism faction.[18]
Disputes over the term's veracity
[edit]There have been various controversies surrounding the use of the term "Albertism." For some political scientists, the term did not exist because at no point did Alberto Fernández seek to challenge Cristina Kirchner for power; instead, he opted to appease rather than confront Kirchnerism.[19] Others with a similar perspective argue that Fernández did not consolidate his leadership beyond Cristina's figure.[20] On the other hand, some argue that the term "Albertism" can be used, but its existence has expired.[21]
According to Fernando "Chino" Navarro, a leader and official in Alberto Fernández's government, days before the march for Loyalty Day, he stated that "the worst thing we can do is confront one march with another" and that "Albertism doesn’t exist, this march is neither Albertist nor anti-Albertist."[22] Another political leader, Hernán Torres Guerrero, stated that Albertism does exist but represents the ideals of an orthodox Kirchnerism, even if Fernández denies it.[23]
Despite this, the media, analysts, and political entities often refer to the term.
Composition
[edit]Several political leaders have been labeled as Albertists, such as Vilma Ibarra, Juan Zabaleta, Jorge Ferraresi, Cecilia Todesca, and Matías Kulfas,[24] Santiago Cafiero, Felipe Solá, Martín Guzmán, Gabriel Katopodis, Marcela Losardo, Sabina Frederic, among others.[25]
References
[edit]- ^ "The "Albertism", a power space left unprotected". LA Nacion (in Spanish). 2008-07-24. Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ a b c Toppi, Hernán Pablo (2022-06-30). "Legislative Elections Argentina 2021: rules, actors, and results". Revista Elecciones (in Spanish). 21 (23): 237–252. doi:10.53557/Elecciones.2022.v21n23.08. ISSN 1995-6290. Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ "Argentina: Cristinismo on the rise". LatinNews. Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ a b Merke, Federico (2019). "Preferences, inheritances, and restrictions: elements to examine the foreign policy of Frente de Todos". Análisis Carolina (24): 1. ISSN 2695-4362. Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ a b Nazareno, Marcelo. "The end of the long Argentine hegemonic tie. The fourth neoliberal wave and the new challenges of the popular field". Revistas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
- ^ a b Dieguez, Martin (July 2022). Realist idealism?: an analysis of the foreign policy of Alberto Fernández's presidency. ISSN 2525-1112. Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ a b c Angelis, Carlos De (2019-09-08). "Birth of Albertism". www.perfil.com (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ Recalt, Rodis (2019-11-03). "Who surrounds Alberto Fernández to counter Cristina Kirchner". Noticias (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ a b Diego, Genoud (2021-04-20). Cristina's Peronism: Frente de Todos, between painful unity, scarcity, and the endless war with the establishment (in Spanish). Siglo XXI Editores. ISBN 978-987-801-075-5. Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Rosso, Fernando (2022-06-15). La hegemonía imposible: Veinte años de disputas políticas en el país del empate. Del 2001 a Alberto Fernández (in Spanish). Capital Intelectual. ISBN 978-987-614-653-1.
- ^ a b c "El albertismo queda más debilitado con el nuevo gabinete nacional". Con La Gente Noticias. 28 July 2022.
- ^ a b "Paso a paso, cómo detonó la salida de Matías Kulfas del gabinete nacional". LA Nacion (in Spanish). 2022-06-04. Retrieved 2025-02-01.
- ^ Padinger, Germán (2023-04-21). "ANÁLISIS | Alberto Fernández desists from re-election: What does it mean?". CNN (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ "Son of the disappeared, a potential candidate for the presidency of Argentina for Kirchnerism". Barrons. Retrieved 2025-02-02 – via Agence France Presse.
- ^ "Massa-Rossi is the unity formula of Peronism, Scioli and Wado withdrew". www.lapoliticaonline.com (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-02-02.
- ^ clae (2019-09-28). "Argentina: El "albertismo", su construcción y problemas". CLAE (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ a b Secul Giusti, Cristian Eduardo (2020). "Albertismo en tiempos de crisis: Estado, solidaridad y unidad". Repositorio de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
- ^ "Latin America: Is there political will to build a different future?". www.flacso.org. Retrieved 2025-01-30.
- ^ "Why "Albertism" doesn't exist?". DataClave (in Spanish). 2021-03-20. Retrieved 2025-01-31.
- ^ ""Albertism doesn't exist, it's Kirchnerism plus Alberto"". LetraP (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-01-31.
- ^ "Sergio Berensztein: "Albertism no longer exists" - Radio Rivadavia AM630". rivadavia.com.ar (in European Spanish). Retrieved 2025-01-31.
- ^ Editores, Futurock (2021-10-18). "Fernando "Chino" Navarro: "Albertism doesn't exist"". Futurock (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-01-31.
- ^ "From Albertism, they relativize Máximo's criticism: "The important one is Cristina"". www.elteclado.com.ar (in Spanish). Retrieved 2025-01-31.
- ^ "Rossi shared an event with "Albertist" ministers to call for unity". El Litoral. Rosario. March 11, 2022.
- ^ Amil, Martín Miguel; Corral, Damián Gustavo; Foresti, Joaquin Gonzalo (December 2022). "La representación de los sectores políticos del Frente de Todos en el gabinete nacional de Alberto Fernández". CONICET. ISSN 1851-6076.