Attack on Selarong

Attacks on Selarong (1825)
Part of Java War
Date 25 July – 4 November 1825 Location Selarong Cave Result Javanese victory
Belligerents
Netherlands	Javanese rebel
Commanders and leaders
Captain Bouwes Major Sellwinj Lt.Col Aachenbac	Diponegoro
Strength
Thousands	Hundreds
Casualties and losses
215 surrendered Hundreds were killed	Few troops were killed

The Attack on Selarong was a series of Dutch military expeditions in 1825 to storm Javanese Prince Diponegoro's primary base at Selarong Cave, at the start of the Java War. The expedition was divided into three phases. All of the expeditions resulted in Dutch failure and were ineffective in relieving pressure on Dutch forces during the siege of Yogyakarta.

Background

After Diponegoro's main base at Tegalreja was burned, he established a new base at Selarong Cave. Diponegoro always used this base to plan strategies against the Dutch, and produce weapons including mortars. After the Dutch learned the location of the cave, they prepared an expedition to attack it.

Expedition

The first expeditions were led by Captain Bouwes on 25 July 1825. When Bouwes's forces entered the cave, they did not find Diponegoro and his family. Upon their retreat, Diponegoro and Javanese forces deployed guerrilla attacks on the Bouwes forces. Bouwes responded with mortars and rifles, but after 215 Dutch soldiers surrendered, Bouwes and his remaining troops retreated.

The second and third expeditions were led by Major Sellwinj and Lieutenant Colonel Achenbac. By October 1825. The expedition failed when Dutch infantry attacked Diponegoro and his family, who managed to escape. Subsequently, Javanese forces launched attacks on the rear flanks of the Dutch, causing heavy casualties.

Aftermath

The expedition ended in failure for the Dutch, and Diponegoro relocated to his primary base on Dekso. The British historian Peter Carey said the failure of this expedition "proved ineffective in easing pressure on Yogyakarta which remained under siege" until 20 September 1825, and cites the Javanese guerrilla tactics and their home territory advantage as decisive.