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A conflict continuum is a model or concept various social science researchers use when modeling conflict on a continuum from low to high-intensity, such as from aggression to irritation to explosiveness.[1]

The mathematical model of game theory[a] originally posited only a winner and a loser (a zero-sum game) in a conflict, but was extended to cooperation (a win-win situation and a non-zero sum game),[b] and lets users specify any point on a scale between cooperation,[2] peace,[Note 1] rivalry, contest,[3] crisis,[4]: 2  and conflict[5] among stakeholders.

Overview

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By the decade of the 2010s, military planners realized that additional capabilities in communications, sensors, and weapons countermeasures made it possible for competitors to react to a contestant's moves in the "gray zone" just short of conflict.[6] In 2018, Kelly McCoy identified a continuum within competition itself,[7] as explored in the United States Joint Staff's Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), up to the point just short of armed conflict, while noting Perkins' connection to deterrence in the continuum.[8] In 2020, Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside cautioned that for strategists, the "gray zone" must not blur peace and war; they offered an analysis of the need for strategists to clearly distinguish peace, competition, contest, conflict, and war.[9][10]

Standoff is the condition of deadlock between antagonists,[11][c] sometimes measured by the distance between them (standoff distance). For n antagonists in a non-zero sum game, von Neumann and Morgenstern showed in 1944[a] that this condition is equivalent to a zero-sum game with n+1 antagonists, where the n+1st player ("the fictitious player") is not an entity.[13]: 505  Rather, the fictitious player represents the global profit (or loss) of the n players in the non-zero sum game.[12] [b][a] If we reduce this game to a zero-sum 3-player game by the introduction of a fictitious player 3, then the characteristic function becomes the one given.[13]: 501 [14] In Tibor Scitovsky's terminology (more commonly known as the Kaldor–Hicks criterion), this global profit (or loss) of the n+1st player represents the amount that the gainers would have been prepared to pay to the losers (or, in a global loss, the global amount that the n players have lost in total), in order to attain a desired global policy.[15]

Overmatch is the condition where protagonist A is able to present multiple dilemmas[16] to an antagonist E. Thus, if E can recognize that E risks total destruction (annihilation),[16] then it is possible to bring an end to conflict between A and E. If A can bring about overmatch for all E's, the hegemony of A would result, temporarily. In other confrontations between A and the Es, deterrence can be the mutual recognition that power need not be used to destroy one another (mutually assured destruction). Instead, A might display or project its power to the Es as a substitute for battle with them.[17] If A's power can remain leashed (potential rather than kinetic)[d] then soft power and hard power are also optional possibilities on a continuum of possible conflict between A and the Es.[19]

Various continuum models

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Elise Boulding's conflict continuum

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Elise M. Boulding was a Quaker sociologist influenced by the events of World War II. Examining how war becomes peace, she posited a continuum between wars of extermination[20] and transformation.[21]

This is Boulding's conflict continuum:[20]

War of extermination
Limited war
Threat systems (deterrence)
Arbitration
Mediation
Negotiation (exchange)
Mutual adaptation
Alliance
Co-operation
Integration[20]
Transformation[21]

Andra Medea's types of conflict

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Theorist Andra Medea seeks to explain how individuals, small groups, organizations, families, ethnicities, and even whole nations function when disputes arise between them. She posits that there are four types or levels of conflict, each operating under distinct rules:[22]

(1) Problem Solving     (2) Domination     (3) Blind Behavior     (4) Rogue Messiah

Each level moving from first to fourth is characterized by increasing degrees of separation from reality, and decreasing degrees of maturity, in this context, defined as the ability to control anger and settle differences without violence or destruction. Problem-solving behavior is based in reality and maturity, and is therefore more rational and mature than domination. Domination is more rational and mature than blind behavior, which is more rational and mature than the Rogue Messiah.[23]

However, each level moving from fourth to first is more capable than the one below it at forcing victory in a conflict. The rogue messiah overpowers blind behavior, blind behavior thwarts domination, and domination deadlocks problem-solving.[23]

Perkins' continuum of conflict

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See also: Reorganization plan of United States Army § Multi-domain operations (MDO), and Hybrid warfare
Conflict continuum: competition short of conflict, conflict itself, and the return to competition,[16]: 10  possibly via deterrence —Gen. David G. Perkins

Before 2017, winning a conflict was seen as the objective of the US Army.[24] By 2018, the US Air Force showed it is important to reformulate this strategy, as part of a larger process of multi-domain operations (MDO),[e] which involve more than an army in a theater of war (World War II and Cold War model). Specifically, MDO can offer options short of war, which can defuse armed conflict from total war into deterrence, compromise, or cooperation between competitors.[26][27][28][29][30][31][32]

Multi-domain operations[e] occur as overlapped, integrated operation of cyberspace,[f] space (including satellite operations), land, maritime, and air.[36][e] A multi-domain task force was set up in 2018 in I Corps for the Pacific.[16][37][38] Multi-domain battalions, which first stood up in 2019, comprise a single unit for air, land, space, and cyber domains.[39]

The MDO model recognizes that near-peer competitors might not actually seek conflict with each other, but perhaps merely a near-term advantage in order to buy time for themselves[40][41] in the face of overmatch. For example, the X-37B space plane can change its orbit; this capability has military applications.[42] On July 15, 2020, Cosmos 2543 emitted a kinetic vehicle, which emitted a tertiary object. This maneuver is interpreted as a test of anti-satellite capability.[43][44] Cosmos 2542 has been tailing USA-245, a KH-11.[45] Other multi-domain operations short of war,[46] but still escalating the conflict, might include the shooting-down of military drones.[47][48] By May 2023, a robotic Chinese space plane (similar to the X-37B) in orbit from October 2022 to May 2023 had successfully released, and then recaptured an orbiting object.[49] In August 2023, USSF Space Systems Command and the NRO revealed countermeasures to China's maneuverable space vehicles that are in geosynchronous orbit.[50]

Other operations short of war in 2018 include undeclared conflicts, involving proxy military units funded by oligarchs,[51][g] but specifically disclaimed by near-peer competitors.[52][g] This is in direct response to the strategy which the US has promulgated since 1949.[53][g]

Destruction of infrastructure such as fuel pipelines,[55][56][57][58][59] the energy grid,[60][61] or the GPS network, or the financial markets, or confidence in national law and order may be goals for partners, competitors, or adversaries,[62][63] depending on where they might be in the continuum of conflict.[64][65][66] Directed energy attacks on US embassies, and even the White House are cropping up, as reported in April 2021.[67][68]

Conflicts of belief, and conflicts of their underlying narratives can lead to social disorder, sometimes resulting in depression or suicide.[69] Thus, disinformation could be a tactic in the spectrum of conflict.[70][71][72][64][73]

Competition continuum

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In 2021, the 40th Chief of Staff of the United States Army identified three dimensions of military competition: 1) narrative, 2) direct (zero-sum), and 3) indirect (non-zero sum) competition.[74] Narrative competition shapes and frames a baseline within which direct, or indirect competition with adversaries are related. In progressive stages of the narrative, allies, partners, neutral parties, observers, and rivals are encouraged to cooperate with the protagonist. Alternatively, adversaries are deterred from military conflict against the protagonist.[74]

If an adversary persists in direct competition, the protagonist simply continues to advance with direct competition, thereby gaining leverage over the adversary. The protagonist might find it possible only to impede the adversary; in this case, allies and partners may interoperate against the adversary for mutual advantage with the protagonist.[74]

If rivals or adversaries persist in indirect competition, the protagonists seek advantage over them by building relationships with cooperating allies, partners, neutral parties, or observers; in addition, the protagonists keep a forward presence in the theater; the protagonists also must keep their capabilities relevant, competitive, and current. Cost becomes a factor, as adversaries learn by simply trying to keep up.[74] Eventually indirect competition could stabilize;[Note 1] however, the 40th Chief of Staff notes competition is an infinite game.[74]

Notes

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  1. ^ a b A state of Nash equilibrium

Footnotes

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  1. ^ a b c von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[12]
  2. ^ a b Simplest 2-player Nonzero Sum Game: Book review by Copeland (1945)[13]: 503–504 
  3. ^ In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is an array of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can obtain a higher payoff by switching to a different strategy while the strategies of all other players are held fixed.[2]: 526–528 
  4. ^ In light of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine US Defense Secretary 'Austin pointed to early failures by Russia, including almost immediate struggles with logistics, and difficulties getting food, water and supplies to troops'.[18]
  5. ^ a b c The US Army's unclassified Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept is "the combined arms employment of capabilities from all domains that create and exploit relative advantages to defeat enemy forces, achieve objectives and consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict".[25]
  6. ^ In 2018 new cyber authorities were granted under National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 13;[33] persistent cyber engagements at Cyber Command are the new norm for cyber operations.[34][35]
  7. ^ a b c Erdogan bluntly informed Putin in a phone conversation that Turkey would react "in the harshest way" to any future attacks on its forces. The proxies are across Turkey's border from Idlib (Syria), which is largely held by Syrian fighters allied to al-Qaeda and rebels backed by Ankara (Turkey).[54]

References

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  1. ^ "Conflict Management". The University of Iowa. 26 July 2007. Archived from the original on 2 October 2010. Retrieved 30 November 2010.
  2. ^ a b Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jörgen (May 2016). "What is ... Nash Equilibrium?" (PDF). Notices of the American Mathematical Society. Vol. 63, no. 5.
  3. ^ Hitchens, Theresa (19 June 2019). "OPIR missile warning sats plow ahead amid $$ turmoil". breakingdefense.com.
  4. ^ James McConville Chief of Staff paper #1, Headquarters, Department of the Army (16 March 2021) Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict unclassified version
  5. ^ "Levels of War: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical" (PDF). doctrine.af.mil. Curtis LeMay Center. 2015.
  6. ^ South, Todd (24 January 2020). "From long-range fires to countering drones, the Army looks to link weapons systems across the force". Army Times.
  7. ^ McCoy, Kelly (11 April 2018). "In the beginning, there was competition: The old idea behind the new American way of war". Modern War Institute. mwi.usma.edu. West Point, NY: United States Department of the Army.
  8. ^ "Competition Continuum". Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) (PDF). Joint Doctrine. 3 June 2019. Note 1-19.
  9. ^ Stoker, Donald; Whiteside, Craig (2020). "Blurred Lines: Gray-zone conflict and hybrid war – Two failures of American strategic thinking". Naval War College Review. Vol. 73, no. 1. Article 4.
  10. ^ Junge, Michael (10 March 2020). "What should I wear to the war? Formal vs. informal war". Modern War Institute. mwi.usma.edu. West Point, NY: United States Department of the Army.
  11. ^ Standoff, Noun: A deadlocked confrontation between antagonists."Standoff". wiktionary. 13 February 2022.
  12. ^ a b von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (25 June 2005) [1944]. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th anniversary commemorative ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691130613. Retrieved 25 February 2018.
  13. ^ a b c Copeland, Arthur H. (July 1945). "Book review of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944)" (PDF). Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Book review). pp. 498–504.
  14. ^ von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [archived copy] (1st ed.).
  15. ^ Scitovsky, Tibor; Shaw, E.S. Tarshis (1951). Mobilizing Resources for War: The economic alternatives.
  16. ^ a b c d Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army November–December -2017/Multi-Domain-Battle-The-Advent-of-Twenty-First-Century-War/ (November–December 2017) Military Review III "Multi-Domain Battle The Advent of Twenty-First Century War"
  17. ^ Yasuhito Tanaka (9 Sep 2018) On zero-sum game formulation of non zero-sum game
  18. ^ Lolita Baldor (3 May 2022) Defense leaders say Russia learning from mistakes in Ukraine:
    • "As we saw things unfold on the ground, we saw them not able to support themselves logistically, we saw them make some bad assumptions at the beginning of this, we saw them fail to integrate aerial fires with their ground maneuver, and just a number of missteps", Secretary Austin said. "I attribute a lot of that to lack of leadership at the lower level".
  19. ^ Matthew Rothenberg (6/19/2019) For the industrial Internet of Things, defense in depth is a requirement
  20. ^ a b c Hocker, Joyce; Wilmot, William W. (1995). Interpersonal Conflict (4th ed.). Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark.
  21. ^ a b "History". The Institute for Global Leadership. 2001. Archived from the original on 26 July 2011.
  22. ^ Andra Medea interviewed by Jerome McDonnell (audio). WorldView. Chicago, IL: WBEZ. 16 May 1999.
  23. ^ a b Medea, Andra (1996). The Conflict Continuum. Chicago, IL. p. 1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  24. ^ Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World —Gen. David G. Perkins
  25. ^ Jen Judson (23 Mar 2022) Multidomain operations concept will become doctrine this summer
  26. ^ Douglas A. Ollivant (June 17, 2019) On Will and War
  27. ^ MDO Challenge (15 May 2019) *Start here* MDO 101 – General explanation of multi-domain operations (MDO) for the layman.Multi Domain Operations – Oct. 2, 2019 – Overview video 7:41 illustrating TRADOC pamphlet TP 525-3-1.
  28. ^ Lt. Col. Edward A. Fraser and Command Sgt. Maj. Robert V. Abernethy (April 1, 2019) Strong Europe: A continental-scale combat sustainment laboratory – Includes Euler diagram of European alliances, partners, competitors.
  29. ^ Sgt. LaShic Patterson (August 6, 2019) 2/2CR unloads vehicles at the Poti port for AS19 – Agile Spirit 19: Vaziani Military Base, Tbilisi, Georgia
  30. ^ Maj. Kevin Sandell, U.S. Army Central Public Affairs (June 26, 2019) U.S. physician teaches Steppe Eagle 19 medical participants to 'race the Reaper'
  31. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. (June 13, 2019) Poland Deal Lays Groundwork For Division-Strength Deployment: A division-scale exercise next year in Europe, Defender 2020, will be the largest in a quarter-century. Establishes 7 major elements going forward beyond 2020.
  32. ^ Wendover Productions (27 August 2019) The US' Overseas Military Base Strategy Estimates 800 current DoD bases, but some of them are transitory. Video clip.
  33. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (17 September 2018) Trump Eases Cyber Ops, But Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff
  34. ^ Mark Pomerleau (8 May 2019) New authorities mean lots of new missions at Cyber Command
  35. ^ Gary Sheftick, Army News Service, (September 17, 2019) Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security Gen. Nakasone's report on cyber to AUSA
  36. ^ YouTube (Sep 16, 2015) Perkins discusses operationalizing the Army Operating Concept
  37. ^ Maj. Richard W. Gibson (October 1, 2018) Applying Multi-Domain Concepts Against Counter-Space Threats Archived 20 April 2019 at the Wayback Machine
  38. ^ ASHLEY TOWNSHEND, THOMAS LONERGAN, AND TOBY WARDEN (29 Sep 2021) THE U.S.-AUSTRALIAN ALLIANCE NEEDS A STRATEGY TO DETER CHINA'S GRAY-ZONE COERCION
  39. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (24 Jan 2019) Hack, Jam, Sense, & Shoot: Army Creates 1st Multi-Domain Unit an MDO BN for Targeting, I Corps
  40. ^ Caitlin Doornbos (14 Feb 2022) Austin to visit defense officials in Poland, Belgium and Lithuania as potential Russian invasion of Ukraine looms
  41. ^ Morganteen, Jeff; Miller, Andrea (26 September 2019). "Hypersonic weapons are the center of a new arms race between China, the US and Russia". CNBC.
  42. ^ The X-37B space plane can change its orbit:
  43. ^ Theresa Hitchens (23 July 2020) Russian Sat Spits Out High-Speed Object In Likely ASAT Test
  44. ^ The Economist (Aug 9th 2020) A Russian satellite weapon shows the danger of hazy rules in space
  45. ^ Joseph Trevithick (30 January 2020) A Russian "Inspector" spacecraft now appears to be shadowing an American spy satellite USA-245 is a KH-11 series satellite; Cosmos 2542 is now tailing the USA 245's movements with a precision of 150 to 300 kilometers. See Hall thruster
  46. ^ Catherine Kim (21 June 2019) Vox Sentences: The strike that never happened
  47. ^ Paul McCleary (14 June 2019) Centcom confirms Reaper shoot-down, says Iran and Houthis fired at drones
  48. ^ Paul McLeary (September 23, 2019) NATO's not ready for Saudi-Style drone attacks; 'It's a serious problem'
  49. ^ Joanna Thompson (21 May 2023) China's mysterious space plane released an unidentified 'object' in orbit, US intelligence reveals
  50. ^ Emma Poole (31 Aug 2023) The US Satellite Intelligence Agency is not so silent about the new "Silent Barker" mission is NRO's GSSAP maneuverable replacement, will keep custody of tracked vehicles.
  51. ^ Voice of America, Putin calls Russian mercenaries private contractors, claims they are not 'engaged in combat', Polygraph.info, published 22 June 2019, accessed 14 December 2023
  52. ^ Battle of Khasham in Syria, January 2018
  53. ^ James Kitfield (16 October 2018) Russia's strategy, ISIS' future & countering China: CJCS Dunford speaks
  54. ^ Meyer, Henry; Kozok, Firat (6 February 2020). "Putin swallows irritation at Erdogan as Syria clash strains ties". bloomberg.com.
  55. ^ Reuters (8 May 2021) Cyber attack shuts down top U.S. fuel pipeline network
  56. ^ BBC (May 10, 2021) US Scrambles to Keep Fuel Flowing After Pipeline Cyberattack. Russian Cybercriminals Suspected
  57. ^ Dustin Volz (10 May 2021) U.S. Blames Criminal Group in Colonial Pipeline Hack Darkside
  58. ^ Dustin Volz Associated Press (10 May 2021) US invokes emergency powers after cyberattack shuts crucial fuel pipeline
  59. ^ Brad D Williams (27 May 2021) DHS Cyber Order Signals Shift To 'Mandatory Measures'
  60. ^ Eaglen, Mackenzie (27 November 2019). "Winning the U.S. military's 'away game'". Protecting electricity supply. Compromised infrastructure by rival providers.
  61. ^ A probe of the grid was detected by Department of Energy, as reported in April 2019:
  62. ^ Koebler, et. al. Koebler, Jason; Cox, Joseph; Maiberg, Emanuel (5 February 2020). "An 'off-the-shelf, skeleton project': Experts analyze the app that broke Iowa". vice.com. Iowa Reporter App: 'the app was clearly done by someone following a tutorial.'
  63. ^ Cimpanu, Catalin (5 February 2020). "Microsoft says it detects 77,000 active web shells on a daily basis". Windows defender ATP detects '77,000 active web shells, spread across 46,000 infected servers'.
  64. ^ a b Freedberg-- Freedberg, Sydney J. Jr. (24 September 2019). "Fog of information war: Army asks civilians, allies for aid". breakingdefense.com.
  65. ^ Kyle Rempfer (20 September 2019) Army's new chief looks to prep the force for large-scale combat 40th CSA mulls deployments for Large-Scale Combat Operations – LSCO
  66. ^ BBC "Saudi Arabia oil facilities ablaze after drone strikes". BBC News. 14 September 2019.
    "10 Drones attack Saudi Arabia's oil and gas facilities". BBC News. 15 September 2019.
  67. ^ Katie Bo Williams and Jeremy Herb Apr 2021) US investigating possible mysterious directed energy attack near White House
  68. ^ LARA SELIGMAN and ANDREW DESIDERIO (05/10/2021) Russian spy unit suspected of directed-energy attacks on U.S. personnel
  69. ^ Star, Susan Leigh; Bowker, Geoffrey C.; Neumann, Laura J. (August 1997). "Transparency At Different Levels of Scale: Convergence between Information Artifacts and Social Worlds".
  70. ^ MICHAEL STARR, AARON REICH, REUTERS Jerusalem Post (13 Feb 2022) Ukrainian president clarifies 'ironic' claim that Russia to attack on Wednesday
  71. ^ Mackintosh, Eliza (May 2019). "Finland is winning the war on fake news. What it's learned may be crucial to Western democracy" (Report).
  72. ^ Davey Alba and Adam Satariano (26 September 2019) At Least 70 Countries Have Had Disinformation Campaigns, Study Finds"the number of countries with political disinformation campaigns more than doubled to 70 in the last two years"—The New York Times
  73. ^ Sun Tzu The Art of War, Chapter XIII, Commentary on Sun-Tzu's text in Small Wars Journal. See also the Lionel Giles translation, 1910 XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
  74. ^ a b c d e Chief of Staff paper #2 (1 March 2021) The Army in Military Competition
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