Draft:Military Design Movement

The Military Design Movement represents a minority yet influential group of defense theorists, innovators, and educators that apply design methodologies toward defense, security, and foreign policy applications, often in a mixed disciplinary approach. The military design movement tends to operate in the fringes of the military community, sometimes labeled as contrarians, heretics, and disruptors by mainstream military educators, trainers, and doctrine writers. Some design concepts have been incorporated into various military doctrines, while other aspects of design remain outside traditional or accepted institutional practices. In a 2019 critical literature review of the military design community, Cara Wrigley et. al explained: "The application of design thinking in military contexts—referred to as “military design thinking”—is seen as separate from civilian design thinking by military practitioners. In order to react to the unprecedented change defense forces are faced with today, a “Military Design Movement” has evolved, which is experimenting with different ways of thinking, particularly the application of design thinking to break open traditional military approaches to planning, problem solving, and development."

This movement is international in scope, particularly across the American, Canadian, Australian, and European defense communities. Several noted military design theorists point to the Israeli Defense Forces and their now defunct defense think tank, the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI), as the origin for the design movement in the late 1990s. Military design began first as a reaction by a minority of military theorists and operators who, by the 1990s and after the end of the Cold War, began to think that existing military beliefs, theories, and methods were incomplete or increasingly irrelevant. These designers felt that too much emphasis was being placed on tactical excellence in closed or simplistic military settings while the broader and increasingly chaotic systems involving modern conflict were being oversimplified and tied to tactical logics.

The military design movement is a modern approach to military strategy and operational planning, emphasizing creativity, innovation, and critical thinking over traditional linear processes. The movement is not without controversy, with significant debate across military services and communities of practice on whether military design is another form of planning, something that better introduces innovation and new techniques into planning activities, or something entirely incompatible with traditional defense organizations as currently configured. Dr. Paul Mitchell, a design educator from the Canadian Armed Forces, describes the design movement with:

"Design thinking is an approach to problem framing, not problem solving, for such scenarios. For designers, framing a problem is intrinsically connected with generating solutions. One cannot be separated from the other. A frame is a particular way of seeing an issue as well as prescribing a solution. For instance, analysts usually understand terrorism from the perspective of their preferred frame. They can see it under the frame of a military issue, a criminal issue, a socio-economical issue, an ideological issue or even an epidemiological issue, to name just a few."

The military design movement is often described as unorthodox due to the mixed disciplinary arrangement coupled with critical review of existing or traditional military planning and strategic methods. Designers bring together unusual combinations of disciplines and fields, including many not normally associated with military activities. These include postmodern theory, fine arts, architecture, complexity theory, and commercial design methods. Design theorists prefer multiple futures over constructing a singluar desired end-state or goal, as found in traditional military strategy and planning.

The military design movement has experimented using these ecletic theories and techniques in what has at times been characterized as an intellectual insurgency within military institutions. Such efforts have led to significant debate, reform, along with controversy and rejection. Design experimentation has been applied in highly specialized training such as the United States Army Special Operations Qualification Course, at advanced military schools such as the Army School for Advanced Military Studies, and the Joint Special Operations University. Recent design courses are also now provided for the United States Space Force and United States Space Command through the National Security Space Institute (NSSI).

History

The military design movement can trace its roots back to the late 20th century, particularly gaining traction after the Cold War. The complexity of post-Cold War conflicts, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlighted the limitations of conventional military planning approaches. Traditional military decision-making methodologies utilize a systematic, sequential, and analytically rigorous framework using constructs such as 'ends-ways-means', problem definition paired with proposed solution sets, courses of action that comply with current military doctrine for the organization pursuing the planning activities, and a singular future state where the proposed goal/objective is achieved through planned actions. Military theorists such as Shimon Naveh, Christopher Paparone, Grant Martin, Ofra Graicer, Aaron Jackson, and Ben Zweibelson critique traditional military processes as overly fixated within a Newtonian Worldview, where the complexities of war and conflict are oversimplified using metaphoric devices found in physics, chemistry, engineering activities, and biology.

Military design challenges not just the methodologies employed in traditional military planning, but also how these organizations form their social frames in terms of ontological and epistemological choices within the military decision-making methodologies. Designers draw from complexity theory, organizational theory, postmodern philosophy, general systems theory, and a variety of other unorthodox or typically non-military disciplines to incorporate into the design approach. Design theorist Grant Martin explains this tension between military designers and military planners with:

"There are two fundamental problems, from my view, with the U.S. Military’s preferred approach. The first is that the institution assumes the logical positivist view that war is fundamentally the same as a solar system or a rock. In the military’s case it is the conflation of tactics with the aggregated effects of tactics. The U.S. Military assumes that tactical action is the same as aggregating that tactical action over time to accomplish policy objectives. The same type of cognitive tools that a platoon leader might use to prepare for an ambush patrol are the same ones that higher-ranking staff officers and leaders should use for the accomplishment of policy objectives, that is that cause and effect are linear and deterministic, no matter what kind of phenomena with which one is confronted. It is the same faulty logic that assumes that the lines of operation construct can be used to accomplish objectives during “stability” missions simply by aligning the lines under their purpose, as if “purpose” and “stability” are best thought of as a geographic landscape."

The military design movement was notably formalized in the 2000s, with various military forces beginning to incorporate design methodologies from fields like architecture, urban planning, and business strategy into military planning. The first formalization occurred in the Israeli Defense Forces, with Brigadier General Shimon Naveh prominently associated with the first phase. These Israeli military theorists termed their approach 'Systemic Operational Design', or SOD. After controversy and fierce debate within the Israeli military after the 2006 Lebanon War, Naveh and the SOD proponents were removed from IDF education and training, with OTRI disbanded. Naveh then began teaching SOD in the United States to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, including at elite planning schools such as the Army School of Advanced Studies in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

During this period, Naveh and fellow systemic operational design thinkers advocated an emancipation from the legacy framework of traditional military strategy, planning, and doctrine. They advocated using a blend of disciplines including general systems thinking, complexity theory, along with more eclectic fields such as postmodern philosophy, architecture, and advanced mathematics. Military design breaks with traditional planning methodologies and may strike observers as highly unorthodox and rather chaotic. Design educator Alex Ryan described in a blog how he first witnessed Shimon Naveh facilitate students at the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2006:

"After about an hour of Shimon’s theoretical exegesis, [retired Brigadier General] Huba [Wass de Czege, founder of the SAMS program] provided some translation and interpretation through storytelling, and then the students broke out into small teams to work on the next iteration of their design inquiry. I was fascinated. Over the past decade, I had observed and participated in dozens of Army planning exercises, and read about hundreds more. This was almost exactly like none of them. There was no evidence of division of labour according to the Staff System. There was no sequential process being followed. There were no PowerPoint Slides being produced. Most surprising of all, there were no doctrinal manuals in sight."

Israeli SOD was briefly popular in the IDF from 2000-2005. It revolutionized decision-making within the traditionally structured Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) before its abrupt termination by 2006. Emerging as a response to complex warfare, SOD sought to replace rigid, linear military thinking with a systemic, postmodern approach. However, with Lieutenant General Dan Halutz succeeding Lieutenant General Ya’alon as Chief of Staff in 2006, the new leadership dismantled the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI)—SOD’s birthplace—and eradicated its influence. By 2007, the IDF had fully rejected military design, sidelining Naveh and his proponents. Officers linked to SOD faced marginalization or forced retirement prior to the 2006 Lebanon War, and for the next six years (2006–2013), Naveh and collaborator Ofra Graicer taught SOD internationally, effectively banished from Israel. This exile birthed a global design movement, proving the adage that "no man is a prophet in his own land."

The reasons for SOD’s sudden abandonment between 2005 and 2006 remain debated, shrouded in political and personal disputes within IDF leadership. Proponents argue SOD was a catalyst for overdue innovation, while critics claim it confused senior leaders and muddled operations. The truth remains elusive, with both sides fiercely divided. Lieutenant General Halutz, a career aviator, reportedly favored "effects-based operations" (EBO), a reductionist framework rooted in aviation logic and popularized by the U.S. Air Force in the 1980s–1990s. EBO’s emphasis on precise, measurable outcomes clashed with SOD’s systemic, multi-paradigmatic ethos, which rejected formulaic standardization. This tension peaked just before the 2006 Lebanon War, when SOD’s gradual integration—halted in June 2006—was replaced by traditional planning and EBO-influenced aviation strategies under Halutz’s command.

The IDF’s 1990s–early 2000s experimentation reflected a tumultuous, tribal environment, with factions pushing radical reforms like SOD against defenders of legacy concepts or EBO. During the Lebanon War, some ground units applied SOD tactically, while aviation and naval forces leaned on EBO and linear planning, revealing deep institutional fractures. Graicer and Naveh criticized Halutz’s "shallow-mindedness" from a cockpit perspective, noting his lack of broader command training, while Naveh also lambasted his intellectual unpreparedness—though Naveh’s harsh rhetoric often carried personal bitterness from his expulsion. Post-2006, SOD’s "heretical" postmodern language was purged, and the IDF reverted to pseudo-scientific, conventional frameworks. Historians like Yagil Henkin echoed widespread skepticism, arguing SOD’s complexity obscured clear understanding, a critique common due to the military's traditional problem-solving aversion to experimentation.

Despite early promise—evidenced by Colonel Aviv Kochavi’s 2002 Balata success—SOD struggled to penetrate the IDF. By 2005, only 14 SOD-educated officers remained active, a tiny fraction of senior leadership, limiting its "trickle-down" impact. The pre-Lebanon war purge of SOD advocates, including Naveh’s dismissal and OTRI’s closure, intensified resistance. Internationally, SOD gained traction, influencing figures like U.S. Marine General James Mattis, who in 2008 banned EBO at Joint Forces Command, favoring design-inspired alternatives. In Israel, however, SOD’s demise cemented a return to EBO and traditionalism, leaving its legacy contested amid the 2006 Lebanon War’s fallout.

Grant Martin, a SAMS school graduate during Naveh's time at the program, later experimented with design at the U.S. Army Special Forces program in the Green Beret capstone qualification exercise, 'Robin Sage.' Martin inserted design into the student planning periods for select special forces teams, while others sustained the traditional planning methodologies. Martin later wrote about how the teams given a systemic operational styled design was considered the 'unstructured team, while other teams were provided the Army Design Methodology (ADM) framework, and the control group used the standardized planning processes. Martin described the unstructured special operations student teams in execution with:

"The last group was the unstructured group. During planning, this group normally received information from discussions with me on theoretical design that stressed reflexive thinking, situation-unique preparation, and a multi-paradigmatic approach... They were encouraged to brief only conclusions during their briefings and allow the more detailed areas to be teased out by the higher commander’s interests. Lastly, they were encouraged to disregard everything in their higher’s order initially and to always identify unsupported assertions."

Martin assessed the performance of the various special forces teams during the Robin Sage exercise and came to the conclusion that "The officers and NCOs [in the unstructured design groups] consistently questioned the higher headquarters’ order and its implicit assertions, especially with respect to their sector and how their sector most likely differed from their higher headquarter’s more general characterizations." The unstructured design teams "had the least trouble of all teams in adapting to the reality on the ground. They anticipated many of the problems they would face, and when other problemscropped up, they were more prepared for them. Perhaps most impressive for these teams was their ability, on average, to get to more complex training objectives quicker than the other groups... after completing the exercise a very high percentage of officers on the unstructured teams believed their planning time had been valuable and had helped them learn faster and adapt more effectively."

By 2010, Naveh departed the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies and returned to Israel to resume teaching in 2013 at the General Officer School in Tel Aviv. He was joined by Dr. Ofra Graicer, and together they have educated Israeli senior military and government leaders on military design theory.

Although the American Army was the first military organization outside of Israel to adapt some form of military design theory, the movement quickly spread to Canada, Australia, and across Europe in the 2000s and 2010s. The Canadian military originally had graduates of advanced military schools in the United States return to their forces with design concepts, or through original research published by those graduates and intended for their own militaries to consider. Dr. Paul Mitchell, a military professor at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, wrote of this new movement in a blog with fellow Canadian military theorist, Dr. Phillippe Beaulieu-Brossard. Beaulieu-Brossard along with fellow academic researcher Dr. Philippe Dufort edited a special issue of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies in 2017 titled "Reflexive Military Practitioners: Design Thinking and Beyond." This special issue featured military theorists such as Israel's Dr. Ofra Graicer, Australians Dr. Alex Ryan and Dr. Aaron Jackson, Canadians Dr. Paul Mitchell and Dr. Francis Clermont, American design theorists Dr. Christopher Paparone, Dr. Ben Zweibelson, Dr. Grant Martin, and several articles written by Colombian military design thinkers. Dufort and Beaulieu-Brossard co-founded a Canadian non-profit design organization called the Archipelago of Design in 2017 and have hosted numerous conferences, projects, research efforts, and defense programs through this organization.

Since 2017, the Military Design Movement has expanded in scale and scope across multiple military organizations including formalized education within military universities and related programs. These include the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) that provides tailored education to U.S. Special Operations Command, where Ben Zweibelson provided design education and facilitation including extensive video tutorials available on YouTube at the "Think JSOU" channel.

Military designers have produced an increasingly diverse range of facilitation methods, research, and publications. They have conducted numerous design conferences, hosted TEDx seminars, developed various military design games and simulations, and represent an emerging sub-field within security affairs, the political sciences, foreign policy applications, and within military doctrine and education.

Military Design Methodologies:

Military designers use a wide range of methods and techniques, where some are standardized through established military doctrine and training, while other approaches are non-standard and highly tailored to unique contexts. Certain military organizations implement purely civilian or commercial design techniques or send personnel to commercial design programs, such as those provided by IDEO, Stanford University's 'D-School', IBM's 'Enterprise Design Thinking' program, or programs where design methodologies such as Agile, Scrum, and similar frameworks are taught.

Several military-centric design methodologies have been developed since the late 1990s independently of the commercial design frameworks. Although many variations exist and continue to be adapted across multiple defense communities, the Israeli Defense Forces, United States Army, United States Marine Corps, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Australian Defence Forces each have featured some form of design methodology in practice, doctrinal publication, education, or training environment. Other services, units, and organizations have also developed or experimented with various design methodologies, models, and techniques.

Israeli Defense Force: Systemic Operational Design

The first configuration of Systemic Operational Design or SOD was established in the late 1990s through the Israeli OTRI think tank with Dr. Shimon Naveh and other collaborators. SOD intended to provide a more holistic, flexible, and adaptive approach to operational planning, moving away from linear, reductionist methodologies common in traditional military planning. It was intended to better handle complex, non-linear environments typical in modern conflicts that the IDF expected to encounter in coming decades. IDF strategic and organizational concerns about performance in late 20th century conflicts would by the 1980s and 1990s stimulate a new generation of IDF officers and war theorists to reflect deeply on what they ought to preserve within the IDF decision-making and operational planning frameworks and what they might replace. SOD became the experimental outcome of these broader, abstract concerns.

The emergence of Systemic Operational Design in the Israeli military was not directly triggered by the First and Second Intifadas but stemmed from deeper concerns in the 1990s among senior military professionals and academics. They observed a decline in intellectual growth and self-reflection within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) since the 1970s, alongside fears that historic enemies like Hamas and Hezbollah were adapting to Israel’s traditional military approaches. Despite skepticism from some who viewed shifts from established methods as risky, the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) was created to encourage innovative thinking on future warfare. Led by Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, OTRI drew from diverse fields—architecture, sociology, philosophy, and systems thinking—to develop SOD, a radical reconceptualization of military decision-making and organization aimed at breaking from conventional norms.

SOD, inspired by design movements like Bauhaus School that flourished in Germany's Interwar Period, sought to disrupt traditional military paradigms. Naveh’s use of “operational” emphasized experimentation and reflective practice, drawing from sociological theorists like Donald Schön and Karl Weick, rather than aligning with the Western military’s hierarchical strategy-operations-tactics model. This caused confusion, as SOD’s “operational” defied the technical, linear frameworks of modern militaries, instead embracing complexity and social constructivism—viewing the world as dynamic and emergent rather than fixed. Western interpretations often misaligned SOD with operational art, which integrates ends, ways, and means, missing its intent to deconstruct outdated constructs. Many traditional operational artists were highly skeptical of SOD's disruptiveness and apparent incompatibility with doctrinal planning methods.

SOD’s dense, postmodern language and rejection of reductionist military logic sparked resistance and misunderstanding, particularly as Naveh repurposed familiar terms in unconventional ways. Designed in Hebrew for Israel’s unique security context, SOD faced further distortion when translated into English-speaking militaries like the U.S., where it was awkwardly fitted into planning sequences. Naveh intended SOD for senior IDF leaders—specifically generals—reflecting Israel’s military culture where generals personally design strategies, unlike in the U.S., where staff typically handle such tasks. This focus on top-tier education, delivered through Israel’s General Officer School, underscored cultural differences and limited SOD’s spread to lower ranks, contrasting with militaries like the U.S. and Canada, which introduced design at various levels.

While Naveh insisted only generals should design—possibly reflecting his own bias as a former general—his collaborator Dr. Ofra Graicer, a non-general, also successfully taught SOD, suggesting flexibility in its application. SOD aimed at large-scale operational and strategic challenges, though it wasn’t inherently limited to those domains. Its radical approach, blending complexity theory and postmodern ideas, demanded reflective thinking that proved difficult for many, yet this provocation was central to Naveh’s goal of rethinking warfare. Misinterpretations and institutional resistance persisted, but SOD remains a distinctive Israeli framework, shaped by its origins and Naveh’s uncompromising vision.

Unlike traditional military planning methods that break down problems (reductionism, positivism) into smaller parts, SOD views the operational environment as a complex, dynamic system with interconnected parts that cannot be appreciated outside of this systemic or holistic perspective. It focuses on understanding and exploiting the relationships and tensions within this system where one resists dismantling or simplifying the system. Instead, SOD practitioners seek to learn with the system and through interactions, gain new insights and opportunities to exploit previously unknown processes.

SOD uses a series of seven discourses or discussions to iteratively develop an understanding of the operational environment. These include framing, conceptualizing the tensions and system-wide phenomenon that manifest what is perceived as a 'problem', and how the current environment requires iterations of designer inquiry to better appreciate it.

SOD evolved through three major phases, each reflecting a dynamic, postmodern approach to military design. Rejecting traditional, linear military theory, SOD embraces complexity and emergence, drawing from eclectic fields like philosophy and systems thinking. Naveh’s framework prioritizes unique, disposable strategies over standardized solutions, resisting doctrinal rigidity. Inspired by postmodern thinkers like Deleuze and Guattari, SOD introduces concepts such as “rhizomes” and “smooth spaces,” challenging the modern military’s preference for order and predictability. This fluidity, while innovative, clashes with conventional warfighting logic, creating both intellectual power and confusion.

SOD Phase 1: 1990s through 2005:

The first version of SOD is a postmodern, iterative methodology aimed at reimagining military strategy through seven distinct stages. It rejects traditional, linear military frameworks, embracing complexity and artistry to create unique, context-specific designs for warfare. Each step challenges conventional doctrine, demanding reflective practice and intellectual agility, which both fuels its innovation and limits its accessibility. The steps are listed below and graphically depicted in how OTRI first depicted SOD for military practitioners.

1. Systems Framing: The process begins with designers constructing a "frame of understanding" tailored to the specific security context. This step involves mapping the system’s components and relationships, avoiding pre-set templates. SOD insists on a customized systemic inquiry, setting the stage for a fluid, adaptive approach rather than relying on standardized military assumptions. One frames the system of conflict pursuing a fresh, often critical insight into what is happening, why things are unfolding as such, and what sorts of systemic tensions might be manifesting across the entire system that produce the current military environment.
2. Rival Rationale (later System of Opposition): Designers then define the opposing system, originally termed "rival rationale" and later renamed "system of opposition." This step entails deconstructing the enemy’s logic and structure, identifying its dynamics and vulnerabilities. It reflects SOD’s emphasis on understanding complexity through opposition, a departure from traditional threat analysis. SOD pursued systemic framing of the opposition instead of a systematic reductionist approach favored by most Western militaries.
3. Reframing Operational Heuristics: Here in the third SOD step, designers prototype and experiment, reframing initial assumptions through what Naveh calls "operational heuristics and learning meta-theory." This stage integrates systems theory and postmodernism, encouraging iterative exploration over fixed plans. It resists the checklist mentality of commercial design, prioritizing disposable, bespoke solutions. Prototypes are formed and iteratively manipulated, leading to multiple design failures that systemically nudge the design team toward new (often controversial or disruptive) insights. This design process is nonlinear, meaning they cannot declare desired end-states or strategic goals and point a pathway to reach them. Instead, they are in a conceptual wilderness, seeking new pathways while walking upon unfamiliar, alien terrain.
4. Problematization: Designers then engage in "problematization," questioning the system’s underlying assumptions and reframing the problem itself. This step blends intellectual paradoxes—combining systems thinking with postmodern critique—pushing beyond Newtonian military logic to uncover new perspectives on the conflict. One cannot use military doctrine or established processes here, as these will only force institutionalized conformity upon the designers. They are encouraged to break free, critically challenge the institution, and leave no sacred cows untouched in their search for new thinking and innovation.
5. Systemic Inquiry and Conceptual Artifacts: In the fifth step of SOD, students construct "frames of understanding about emerging ecologies and complex phenomena," producing conceptual and aesthetic artifacts. This involves an iterative "pattern of self-creating," where observation and learning adapt to the context. SOD rejects convergence on a uniform framework, reflecting the diverse, contextual nature of human creativity.
6. Strategy for Transformation: Designers next develop a "strategy for transformation," translating insights into a plan to alter the system dynamically. This stage operationalizes the inquiry’s findings, crafting a tailored approach to shift the conflict’s trajectory. It embodies SOD’s goal of systemic adaptation over rigid execution.
7. Operation Framing: The final step, "operation framing," concludes the design cycle by outlining an actionable plan—or "operationalization"—rooted in the prior stages’ discoveries. Though a single iteration is rare, this stage crystallizes SOD’s experimental ethos into a unique composition, analogous to a work of art rather than a mass-produced formula. Each SOD effort is unique and cannot be repeated or forced upon another contextually unique military challenge. Just as an artist completes one painting and then moves to a blank canvas to begin anew, SOD designers must approach each operation through a similar creative, disruptive lens.

SOD’s objective is to "deconstruct all assumptions" and map the rival system metaphorically and literally, requiring high artistry and intuitiveness. Naveh drew on postmodern influences like Rancière’s "Ignorant Schoolmaster," centering learning on students without prescriptive guidance. This interpretivist paradigm—prioritizing context over universal maxims—clashes with the functionalist, Newtonian foundations of modern military doctrine, making SOD difficult to explain or codify. Its dense language and rejection of simplification frustrated novices and traditionalists seeking familiar terminology or systematic logic. Critics found its intellectual bar too high, limiting participants to a small, willing cadre. Yet, for those embracing its challenge, SOD offers a transformative lens on warfare, blending innovation with systemic adaptability.

SOD’s evolution reflects Naveh’s refusal to let it ossify, maintaining its experimental essence. Postmodernism’s eclectic nature allows SOD to blend diverse insights, though its dense, exotic concepts—like “assemblages” and “problematization”—alienate many professionals. Eyal Weizman highlights how SOD repurposes theory for military ends, akin to postmodern management trends, yet its radicalism sparks institutional resistance. Designed for Israel’s complex security context, SOD demands reflective, systemic thinking, as Ofra Graicer explains, balancing internal organization and external ecology.

Despite its potential, SOD’s abstract language and rejection of military norms frustrate traditionalists, while its paradoxical mix of postmodernism and systems thinking creates unresolved tensions. Early skepticism in the IDF (1990s–2005) deemed it too theoretical, especially amid the Second Intifada’s urgency. Yet, battlefield experiments, like Colonel Kochavi’s 2002 Balata operation, showcased SOD’s promise—using “fractal geometry” to outmaneuver enemies innovatively, avoiding expected casualties. These cases fueled both advocacy and critique, underscoring SOD’s dual nature: a groundbreaking yet divisive tool for rethinking war.

SOD Phase 2: 2006-2012:

The evolution of Systemic Operational Design (SOD) transitioned from its initial phase in Israel (1995–2005) to a second phase abroad, primarily hosted by the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 2005 onward. After SOD’s rejection by the IDF in 2006, Naveh and his team found a new intellectual home at SAMS, the U.S. Army’s hub for innovative military thought. Here, SOD was reframed and expanded, driven by Naveh’s resistance to American efforts to simplify and doctrinalize it. This created a "dual track" approach: SOD purists, led by Naveh, refined it into a deeper, strategic-focused framework (e.g., his Prolegomena document), while others crafted a diluted, "Americanized" version for broader use. Alex Ryan framed these as the 'home team' versus the 'away team' with:

"Proponents of design basically fell into two camps, which I will call the Home Team and the Away Team. The Home Team wanted to play the game according to the rules of the design paradigm. They were the purists: Design isn’t for everyone. I can’t teach anyone to design, but with a willingness to learn and put in the effort, some people are capable of learning design. Most officers will never get design. It’s best if they don’t even pretend to understand it."

Ryan went on to explain that the 'away team' wanted to play the game according to the rules of the institution. "They were the pragmatists: We need to make Design as simple as possible... Design provides new tools for their toolbox. Every Army Officer can benefit from knowing a little design." The Home Team was, according to Ryan, mostly ignored or marginalized by Army leaders. They were the 'true believers' of SOD, but they tended to only communicate with one another, and fail to make inroads with the rest of the military population that wanted simplified, user-friendly design methods and models. Ryan observed:

"For every 100 students, they would convert one or two devoted acolytes, but in the process they also generated active resistance to design. The Away Team was better received by students. But because none of these students were required to challenge their fundamental beliefs, they were never able to really reframe. Their design projects simply perpetuated the dominant instrumental approach to problem solving."

SAMS, a rigorous program for field-grade officers, originally welcomed Naveh in 2005 amid U.S. military frustration with counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initially introduced by Dr. Jim Schneider, SOD gained traction as a radical solution. Between 2005 and 2009, Naveh mentored SAMS students, embedding postmodern concepts like Deleuze and Guattari’s "A Thousand Plateaus" into their studies of design, strategy, and operations. Students produced a wave of design-focused monographs, grappling with complex ideas like "drift"—a navigational metaphor for adapting to shifting cultural, social, and strategic currents. This marked SOD’s shift from an operational tool in Israel to a strategic framework in the U.S., as Graicer noted, reflecting America’s global role versus Israel’s narrower focus.

Naveh’s esoteric, self-disruptive approach clashed with the U.S. Army’s Newtonian, systematic paradigm, causing friction with TRADOC and SAMS leadership. While purists advanced SOD 2.0—retaining its core methodology but enhanced with new metaphors and geometric configurations—pragmatists extracted simplified elements for doctrine, diverging from Naveh’s vision. This "Americanization" frustrated Naveh, who resisted reducing SOD’s intellectual rigor. By 2009, SOD evolved into a sophisticated yet divisive tool, embraced by a minority of enthusiasts but misunderstood or rejected by those favoring institutionalized planning, highlighting a persistent tension between innovation and tradition in military thought.

Systemic Operational Design (SOD) evolved into "version 2.0" during 2006–2012, as depicted in Ofra Graicer’s published geometric graphic—one of few public insights into SOD’s second phase. After SOD’s 2006 rejection by the IDF, Naveh and Graicer, though not formally banished, shifted to exporting design education abroad, primarily to the U.S., while living in Israel. This SOD 2.0 emerged for two likely reasons: Naveh’s relentless experimentation, treating SOD as an evolving art form with potentially dozens of prototypes, and a strategic rebranding to distance it from SOD 1.0’s tarnished reputation in the post-Second Lebanon War. American pressure to simplify SOD for doctrine also influenced its reframing, though Naveh resisted dilution, retaining core concepts beneath a new presentation.

SOD 2.0’s development coincided with Naveh’s tenure at the U.S. Army’s SAMS (2005–2009), where he taught a mix of original and updated SOD ideas. The shift may reflect both Naveh’s creative leaps and a need to counter Israeli criticism—amplified by media and SOD’s purged opponents—linking SOD 1.0 to wartime failures. While the IDF never officially exiled SOD advocates, forced retirements and cancellations of SOD programs signaled its rejection. SOD 2.0, with a refreshed geometric metaphor, aimed to refine and adapt the methodology for new audiences, notably U.S. and Australian military clients that were eager to learn new concepts while the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies boiled over in the mid-2000s.

After falling out with SAMS in 2009, Naveh and Graicer continued evolving SOD 2.0 with entities like U.S. Special Operations Command. In 2013, the IDF, perhaps recognizing a need for intellectual renewal post-purge, invited them back to teach at the General Officer School. Despite past conflicts and sacrifices, this marked a partial realization of Naveh’s vision, suggesting SOD’s value in fostering critical transformation within the IDF. This led to a 'SOD 3.0' and potentially a new 4th version in the last several years.

SOD Phase 3: 2013-Present:

Systemic Operational Design evolved through distinct phases, with SOD 2.0 emerging between 2006 and 2012, primarily taught to select students at Fort Leavenworth’s SAMS by Naveh and Graicer. While most students from 2004–2012 grasped SOD 1.0—evident in numerous SAMS monographs—SOD 2.0 remained elusive, with few student works explicitly detailing it beyond Graicer’s 2017–2018 publications. Understood mainly by Naveh’s core team, SOD 2.0 served as a bridge to SOD 3.0, the latest iteration by 2022, coinciding with their return to the IDF in 2013. This shift suggests both a rebranding effort and refined teaching methods post-exile. Outside of Graicer's publication, Ben Zweibelson's 2023 book on the military design movement is the only other detailed source on all three phases of SOD.

In Tel Aviv, Naveh and Graicer now teach SOD 3.0 to Israeli General Officers and security leaders, selected by the Chief of General Staff—an informal sign of promotion potential. By 2022, 80% of the General Staff were graduates, a stark improvement from pre-2006 ratios. Their informal classes split students into design teams, guided by mentors with real-world experience, fostering self-reflection and disruption. Naveh, despite aiming for a low profile, remains uncompromising—firing six colonels in 2013 for failing to meet SOD’s intellectual demands, signaling intolerance for simplification or resistance.

SOD 2.0, aesthetically reconfigured with concepts like "drift," aimed to clarify earlier ideas, though its impact on students was limited. SOD 3.0, dubbed "disruptive thinking," abandons geometric shapes for a topographic, "Z"-shaped model inspired by the Greek zeta and Hebrew zayin. This directional design marks a departure from the cyclical limitations of SOD 1.0 and 2.0, offering clarity on the designer’s position within the process. Naveh’s dense, theory-laden explanations persist, but SOD 3.0 reflects a matured approach, targeting open-minded professionals willing to embrace its intellectual rigor.

Systemic Operational Design (SOD) 3.0, as of 2022, represents Naveh’s latest evolution, taught in Herzliya, Israel, to senior IDF leaders at their General Officer Course. Using a "Z-pattern" graphic, SOD 3.0 balances movement, iteration, discourse, and disruption, emphasizing "complex emergence"—a concept alien to Newtonian military paradigms. Below are its key steps, distilled from its current practice:

1. Complex Emergence Recognition: Designers start by acknowledging the fluid, emergent nature of security contexts, depicted as a dotted box in the Z-pattern’s upper left. This step disrupts static, analytical thinking, centering complexity as the foundation for design.
2. Degrees of Freedom Exploration: Students explore "degrees of freedom," theoretically and practically, adapting to real-time shifts. Naveh and Graicer adjust the curriculum annually—or mid-course—encouraging self-awareness and contextual uniqueness as designers "drift" within dynamic systems.
3. Iterative Self-Guided Inquiry: Monthly weekend sessions involve small teams (10–12 generals) tackling real-world challenges. A rotating student leader, prepped over weeks with Naveh’s critique, designs the inquiry without lectures or rigid frameworks, fostering self-directed learning and experimentation.
4. Sub-Team Collaboration: Teams split into sub-groups of 3–4 for active engagement, avoiding disinterest seen in larger SOD 1.0/2.0 groups. This ensures all contribute, enhancing discourse and diverse perspectives from mixed military and security backgrounds.
5. Intervention for Cognitive Breakthroughs: Facilitators intervene only when teams stall cognitively, guiding reflection without dictating solutions, or when success lacks self-awareness, prompting deeper insight through provocative questioning—both leveraging the Z-pattern’s intuitive flow.
6. Reflective Deliverable Presentation: Teams present not just solutions but their cognitive process, emphasizing "why" over "how/what." This reflective practice, rooted in epistemology and ontology, contrasts with U.S. doctrinal focus on actionable outputs.

SOD 3.0’s iterative, topographic Z-pattern offers directional clarity, distinct from earlier geometric models, and targets generals—seen as confident yet open to challenge. Supported by a "wall of mentors," it thrives in Israel’s unique, threat-rich context, fostering radical, institution-shaking innovation amidst a more receptive IDF culture by 2022.

United States Army Design Methodology:

The U.S. Army in the 2000s entered into multiple counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the Post-9-11 'Global War on Terror' Campaign. These complexities challenge traditional Westphalian war concepts, prompting transformation—sometimes proactive, often reactive through battlefield setbacks. Amid the "Global War on Terror" and Great Power Competition, the U.S. Army oscillated between preserving sacred tools and adopting novel ones, a tension exacerbated by its setbacks and frustrations with insurgent successes by low-technology, under-matched adversaries on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) arrived in the mid-2000s, captivating the Army as it sought answers to chaotic conflicts. Introduced via Israel’s pioneering work, SOD promised a radical sensemaking approach. In 2004–2005, TRADOC and SAMS intellectuals engaged Naveh, hosting him at Fort Leavenworth to teach SOD. Its debut at the 2004 Unified Quest wargame—outshining traditional planning and Effects-Based Operations (EBO)—sparked excitement. SOD’s ability to confuse simulated enemies highlighted its potential, leading to deeper integration at SAMS (2005–2009), where students delved into complexity and postmodern theory under Naveh’s guidance.

However, institutional resistance emerged. Innovating risks retiring proven tools, and SOD’s untested, disruptive nature lacked precedent, clashing with the Army’s ritualized legacy systems. Several design proponents noted a post-Gulf War over-reliance on technology and "battle rhythm," blinding the Army to cognitive shifts needed by 2004–2008. SOD’s arrival coincided with doctrinal upheaval, offering a counterpoint to linear thinking.

The Army’s first formal design nod came in the 2006 Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), co-authored with the Marines, who penned the design chapter under Naveh’s influence. The draft reflected SOD’s emphasis on self-reflection and problem-setting, positioning design above planning. Yet, the final version stripped these, aligning design with existing frameworks like "commander’s intent" and "end state," favoring pragmatic assimilation over Naveh’s radical vision. This shift—epitomized by edits from "operational logic" to "situational awareness"—reinforced Newtonian, systematic logic, sidelining SOD’s complexity focus.

Two camps formed: SOD purists advocating paradigm-shifting disruption and pragmatists seeking digestible tweaks. The latter prevailed in doctrine, diluting SOD’s heretical edge. By 2009–2010, formal design outputs like FM 5-0 further distanced Naveh’s influence, entrenching a planning-centric approach. Despite early successes, the Army’s size and conservatism constrained SOD, mirroring Israel’s resistance, though its experimentation seeded lasting, albeit tamed, design discourse.

Between 2004 and 2015, the U.S. Army developed Army Design Methodology (ADM) from initial experiments with Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) into a formalized doctrine, Army Training Publication 5-0.1 (2015). Unlike SOD’s paradigm-shifting intent, ADM subordinates design to existing planning, preserving the Army’s Newtonian, systematic war frame. The "three-ball chart" from 2004 evolved into ATP 5-0.1’s procedural narrative, reflecting a pragmatic camp’s dominance over SOD purists. Here are ADM’s key steps:

1. Frame the Operational Environment: Planners define the current environment externally, isolating it as a static entity. Unlike SOD’s systemic inclusion of designers within the system, ADM treats the environment as observable, using doctrinal models (e.g., METT-TC) to anticipate its "natural tendency" and desired end state, rooted in Clausewitzian rationality.
2. Frame the Problem: The team identifies discrepancies between the current state and a commander-directed end state, framing a "problem" within institutional norms. This contrasts with SOD’s dissolution of problems via emergent systems, as ADM seeks concrete, solvable issues aligned with legacy solutions.
3. Frame Solutions: Planners propose an "operational approach" matching institutionally validated "ways and means" to the problem, emphasizing linear, reverse-engineered logic. SOD’s exploratory innovation is absent; ADM reinforces planning, ensuring solutions fit the Army’s paradigm without necessarily challenging it outside of institutionalized norms and expectations.
4. Reframe (Optional): If needed, teams revisit earlier frames to adjust understanding or approach, driven by progress toward the end state. Unlike SOD’s creative destruction, reframing in ADM is iterative but convergent, refining within doctrinal boundaries rather than disrupting them.

After 2012, the U.S. Army restructured its doctrinal framework, splitting the expansive Field Manual 5-0 (2010) into concise Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and detailed Army Technique Publications (ATPs). ADP 5-0 became the executive summary, while ATP 5-0.1, published in 2015, elaborated the Army Design Methodology (ADM), enhancing methodological depth and definitions. The 2019 ADP 5-0 recombined earlier versions, but ATP 5-0.1 remains the authoritative ADM guide.

From 2006–2010, the Army selectively adopted elements of Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD), sidelining its dense postmodernism and self-framing focus. Instead, ADM leaned on systems thinking and retained Newtonian, legacy decision-making models—favoring systematic, analytical optimization over SOD’s complex, dynamic lens. This pragmatic orientation frames problems as concrete discrepancies between current and desired states, solvable through institutional knowledge and historical "ways and means." ADM thus aligns with the Army’s broader, mechanistic warfare paradigm, resisting the fluidity of complexity theory.

The "three ball chart," introduced in 2009 drafts and formalized in FM 5-0 (2010), visually encapsulates ADM: current environment, desired end state, and problem frame. Stemming from Colonel Stefan Banach and Alex Ryan’s 2009 Military Review article, it positions design as a linear, causal process—observe, define, solve—rooted in doctrinal norms. Though dropped from ATP 5-0.1’s graphics in 2015, its conceptual framework persists, prioritizing planning over paradigm-shifting innovation. Unlike SOD’s disruptive ethos, ADM largely serves as a pragmatic tool, reinforcing institutional stability rather than challenging it.

United States Marine Corps' Design Methodology:

The U.S. Marine Corps first encountered Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) alongside the U.S. Army during the 2003–2004 period, notably through joint events like the U.S. Army Transformation War Games and Unified Quest, an exercise where Naveh was invited to showcase SOD concepts. Both services, heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan’s complex land warfare, sought innovative approaches amid counterinsurgency challenges. Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine, discovered SOD in 2004 via TRADOC and an Office of Net Assessment seminar, later attending an OTRI workshop in Israel. He introduced SOD to Marine leadership, including then-Lieutenant General James Mattis, who saw it as a counter to the Marines’ linear Effects-Based Operations (EBO) fixation.

Collaboration deepened in 2005–2006, with Marines joining Army SAMS exercises and Mattis commissioning U.S. Marine John Schmitt’s white paper, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design.” This systems-focused work omitted Naveh’s postmodernism, aligning with Marine preference for complexity and systems theory over philosophical density. Concurrently, the Army and Marines co-authored Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (2006), with Marines, under Mattis’s direction, drafting the design chapter at Quantico to challenge EBO’s reductionism.

Marine design evolved through works like USMC Major William Vivian’s 2006 white paper on SOD, spurred by Naveh’s Unified Quest encore. Mattis, at MCCDC, championed SOD, initiating bi-weekly design sessions led by Van Riper. However, resistance grew within MSTP, which guarded the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). When Mattis left to take command of I Marine Expeditionary Force, design momentum waned, with institutional inertia favoring traditional planning. In 2009, as JFCOM commander, Mattis banned EBO, pushing design’s revival. This spurred the 2010 MCWP 5-1, which integrated design into MCPP, renaming "mission analysis" to "problem framing" and mandating design in all planning—unlike the Army’s optional approach. The Marine design methodology was similar to the Army Design Methodology and consisted of four steps:

Marine Design Steps (MCWP 5-1):

1. Problem Framing: Identify and define the problem within the operational environment, emphasizing systemic understanding over linear analysis.
2. Design Concept Development: Create a conceptual framework to guide planning, focusing on maneuver warfare principles.
3. Iterative Refinement: Adjust the design through continuous learning and feedback, adapting to complexity.
4. Integration with Planning: Embed design into MCPP, ensuring it informs actionable steps toward objectives.

Marine design, rooted in SOD’s influence, prioritizes systemic flexibility over the Army’s planning-centric ADM, reflecting General Mattis’s vision for adaptive warfare thinking. The publication of this 2010 Marine design framework essentially halted any further overt design development. Although Marines individually experimented with the concepts, the Marine Corps did not publish any additional concept papers or new design doctrine until 2017.

After a seven-year hiatus (2010–2017), the U.S. Marine Corps reengaged with design thinking, mirroring stagnation in the U.S. Army and Australian Defense Force. Amid shifting priorities—drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan and rising near-peer competition—the Marines released the 2017 MSTP 5-0.1 pamphlet, Marine Corps Design Methodology. This pre-doctrinal document, inspired by Army Design Methodology (ADM) and Joint operational design, aimed to provide a practical framework, though it lacked the authority of formal doctrine like MCWP 5-1. Unlike the 2010 MCWP 5-1’s iterative vision, it positioned design as a linear precursor to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), diverging from Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and reflecting ADM’s influence. The reformed Marine Design Process also consists of four steps, but differs in various ways from the earlier 2010 version. This design pamphlet was not prescriptive in the Marine doctrinal sense, and operated as an experimental framework offered to the Marine Corps as a war fighting community to consider.

Marine Design Process (MSTP 5-0.1):

1. Describe the Current State: Designers assess the operational environment’s existing conditions, akin to ADM’s framing but without SOD’s systemic depth. This step assumes a static, external view, aligning with Newtonian reductionism.
2. Describe the Desired State: The team defines a future end state, guided by commander intent and institutional norms. Unlike SOD’s emergent exploration, this targets a pre-set goal within MCPP’s framework.
3. Define the Problem: Designers identify discrepancies between current and desired states, framing a solvable issue. This echoes ADM’s "three-ball" logic, prioritizing concrete problems over SOD’s dissolution approach.
4. Develop an Operational Approach: An actionable framework is crafted for planners, integrating design into MCPP’s linear sequence. This step, unlike SOD’s ongoing adaptation, concludes design, handing off to detailed planning.

The 2017 pamphlet, authored by U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) graduates influenced by SAMS, cited Army and Joint sources, sidelining Shimon Naveh’s SOD legacy from 2004-2010 at Fort Leavenworth. It emphasized tactical design—unique to Marine small-unit focus—contrasting the Army and IDF’s operational-level emphasis. Despite lacking the "three-ball chart," it mirrored ADM’s systematic, problem-solving ethos that still echoed most institutionalized operational planning constructs and doctrines.

In 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps formalized its Marine Design Methodology with the release of MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, revisiting the iterative spirit of the 2010 doctrine. The foreword acknowledges design’s evolution over a decade, positioning it as more than just conceptual planning, yet ties it firmly to solving complex problems. This reflects a continued adherence to a Newtonian, reductionist war paradigm, sidelining Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and complexity theory. The doctrine emphasizes design as a tool for understanding the current situation and crafting broad solutions, applicable across tactical to strategic levels, but retains systematic, linear logic over SOD’s emergent, transformative approach.

Marine Design Process (MCWP 5-10):

1. Problem Framing: Commanders and staff define the operational environment’s current state, desired state, and problem set. This step, central to MCPP, uses critical thinking to isolate issues, contrasting with SOD’s systemic dissolution of problems.
2. Develop a Framework: A structured approach is formulated to bridge the gap between states, aligning with institutional objectives. Unlike SOD’s open-ended exploration, this focuses on actionable, doctrinally compliant solutions.
3. Continuous Design: Design extends beyond initial framing, adapting throughout planning and execution via ongoing dialogue. While iterative, it remains nested within MCPP’s sequential framework, limiting SOD’s disruptive potential.

The 2020 doctrine repeats the 2017 pamphlet’s graphic, minus the intelligence preparation parallel, reinforcing problem framing as the key design phase. It highlights "time and risk" as critical drivers, ensuring design supports rather than challenges legacy planning. Despite claims of nonlinearity, MCWP 5-10 entrenches systematic models, maintaining a commander-led, staff-supported process that prioritizes order over radical rethinking.

The 2020 Marine Corps Planning Process (MCWP 5-10) formalized Marine Design Methodology, closely resembling the 2017 MSTP 5-0.1 pamphlet with minor tweaks and a simpler graphic. It aims for "understanding through critical thinking and dialogue," yet remains bound by rigid, systematic planning within a Newtonian paradigm, rejecting Shimon Naveh’s SOD complexity focus. Design, though "enduring," is framed as a commander-driven, staff-executed process to solve problem sets, emphasizing "time and risk" over transformative disruption.

MCWP 5-10’s claim that "design establishes paradigms" misaligns with paradigm theory, suggesting doctrinal confusion. Commanders, uninvolved in design yet briefed for approval, reinforce hierarchical control, contradicting complexity theory and SOD’s self-reflective intent. The doctrine oscillates between planning and design, offering linear reframing without clear triggers, thus preserving institutional norms over innovative rethinking.

Key Military Design Theorists

Shimon Naveh:

An Israeli military theorist, Naveh was pivotal in developing the Systemic Operational Design (SOD) for the Israeli Defense Forces, which later influenced U.S. military design thinking. Naveh is most famous for developing SOD while working at the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) in Israel. SOD was an attempt to revolutionize military planning by integrating systemic thinking, complexity theory, and design methodologies from other fields like architecture and urban planning into military strategy.

Naveh was instrumental in teaching SOD within the IDF, particularly in the Command and Staff College. He also co-instructs the IDF Generals’ Course with Dr. Ofra Graicer, focusing on strategic thinking for senior military leaders. Naveh proposes that design thinking must challenge existing military constructs in ways that are disruptive, even destructive to an institution.

He introduced unconventional teaching methods, including using metaphors from literature and arts to explain military concepts, challenging students to think beyond traditional military doctrines. Naveh's work is challenging and often criticized as difficult to access and apply. Naveh defends against these criticisms including some arguments that his systemic operational design theory contributed to Israel's poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon War.

SOD has been criticized for its complexity and the steep learning curve it presents, which can make practical application challenging in the fast-paced environment of military operations. Naveh's approach to design facilitation requires multiple iterations of design teams challenging their own assumptions on reality, moving them into cognitively difficult and unfamiliar spaces, which Naveh posits is the best way to unlock new opportunities to experiment and change.

Since 2013, Naveh has taught his latest version of SOD to the Israeli Defense Forces at their General Officer school in Tel Aviv, Israel. He continues to collaborate and co-educate with Dr. Ofra Graicer at the school.

Ben Zweibelson:

Zweibelson is a notable figure in the field of military strategy, particularly known for his work in the military design movement. Zweibelson was mentored by both Shimon Naveh and Ofra Graicer. Naveh was one of the design theorists working at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies when Zweibelson, then an Army Major, attended as a student. Zweibelson advocates for an interdisciplinary approach to military strategy, integrating design thinking with military operations. His work emphasizes complexity theory, postmodern philosophy, and the need for adaptive, non-linear strategies in modern warfare.

Zweibelson authored "Understanding the Military Design Movement: War, Change and Innovation," published by Routledge, (2023) which explores the history and methodology of military design across different countries.

He also wrote "Beyond the Pale: Designing Military Decision-Making Anew," published by the Air University Press (2023), which delves into transforming military decision-making processes using design theory.

Zweibelson is widely published in military journals where he discusses the theoretical frameworks, history, and facilitation methods found in the military design community. In a military design critical literature review conducted in 2019, the authors determined that "Ben Zweibelson is the most frequently occurring and cited author within the dataset. Zweibelson is certainly the most prolific military design thinker and appears to be recognized as a leader within the military design movement." His published content is largely available online, in journals, monographs, blogs, podcasts, video tutorials, and recordings such as TEDx and military themed events.

Zweibelson's methods for design education draw extensively from Shimon Naveh's systemic operational design, but also from Christopher Paparone's work using military sociology. He credits both of these design theorists with deeply influencing his own research. Zweibelson produces unique design exercises and techniques that draw from a range of fields, disciplines, and often incorporate playful and unorthodox constructs.

Ofra Graicer:

Graicer is a prominent design theorist, particularly known for her work in the field of military strategy and Systemic Operational Design (SOD). Dr. Ofra Graicer is an expert in Systemic Operational Design (SOD), which she has been developing and teaching for over two decades. She focuses on transforming military and defense establishments into self-disruptive systems capable of adapting to new challenges.

Graicer co-instructs the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Generals’ Course with Dr. Shimon Naveh, preparing senior military officers for strategic roles. This course aims to equip military leaders with the skills to devise strategy and operations for contemporary and future conflicts. Graicer has worked with various militaries and defense organizations globally to foster innovation and strategic thinking.

Her research spans across Deep Operations, Special Operations, and Cyber strategies. She develops future concepts, war-games, and simulations to explore new military methodologies.

She authored the book "Two Steps Ahead: From Deep Ops to Special Ops – Wingate the General," which has been influential in military command schools since 2009. Graicer has contributed to numerous articles and papers discussing military design, strategic thinking, and operational effectiveness. Her work often explores how military strategies can evolve to meet modern, asymmetric threats.

Graicer is recognized both in Israel and internationally for her contributions to military design theory. She has participated in various international conferences and workshops, sharing her insights on strategic design and operational innovation. She advocates for cognitive agility and self-disruption in military organizations, emphasizing the need for military leaders to continuously challenge their understanding and approach to warfare to remain effective in an ever-changing strategic landscape.

Christopher Paparone:

Christopher Paparone is a retired U.S. Army Colonel who has made significant contributions to military theory, particularly in the fields of military design and epistemology. Paparone served in various command and staff positions in both war and peace across multiple locations including the continental United States, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Bosnia. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College. Paparone earned a Ph.D. in Public Administration from The Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg.

Paparone authored "The Sociology of Military Science: Prospects for Postinstitutional Military Design," published by Bloomsbury Academic in 2013. This work explores military design, advocating for a shift from modernist military science towards a more open, design-oriented epistemology. He has published numerous articles and book chapters in military and academic journals. His work often deals with critical military epistemology (CME), promoting reflexivity and a deeper understanding of military knowledge and decision-making processes.

Paparone has given lectures and participated in workshops on military design, strategy, and leadership. Notable engagements include speaking at the National Defense University and contributions to the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).

Aaron Jackson:

Aaron Jackson has served in the Australian Army Reserve since 2002, where he has held various command, staff, and instructional roles. He achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and, as of 2024, was the Commanding Officer of the 10th/27th Battalion, The Royal South Australia Regiment. His military experience includes deployments in Iraq, the Greater Middle East Region, Timor-Leste, and domestic emergency response operations in Australia.

Jackson holds a Doctorate of Philosophy in International Relations and has been involved in academia as well, including serving as an Academic Year 2018-19 Distinguished Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College.

He edited "Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force," which compiles diverse papers exploring design thinking in military operations. Jackson's first book, "Military Design Thinking: An Historical and Paradigmatic Analysis," provides a deep dive into the evolution of military design thinking, distinguishing between civilian and military approaches.

Jackson has also published numerous articles on military doctrine, design thinking, and operational art, contributing to journals like the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies and Small Wars Journal. He has lectured and written extensively on how military design interfaces with commercial design, and how military doctrine is attempting to incorporate some elements of design thinking while potentially rejecting other aspects.

Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard:

Dr. Beaulieu-Brossard has been heavily involved in the military design movement since 2015, operating through the Canadian Forces College as faculty and as the co-founder for the Archipelago of Design, the Canadian non-profit design organization. Beaulieu-Brossard holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of St-Andrews in Scotland. He also earned both a BA and MA in Political Science with a focus on International Relations and Foreign Policy from the Université du Québec à Montréal. His involvement in the military design movement is extensive, with multiple articles, editorial assignments, videos including TEDx projects, design conferences, education, and facilitation.

He has held positions as a SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council) postdoctoral fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Dr. Beaulieu-Brossard currently serves as an assistant professor (on leave) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto, where he leads the Design, Innovation, and Strategy-Making curriculum for mid and senior-level officers.

Beaulieu-Brossard is also a Marie S. Curie Fellow at the Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, where he has engaged in research and development of military design methodologies. His work primarily explores the sociology of military science, particularly through the lens of design thinking. He has conducted extensive fieldwork tracing the diffusion of design thinking across various military organizations, including the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the US Army, US Special Operations Forces, and the Canadian Armed Forces.

In recent years, he has been highly involved in the "Project Albatross," which explores the potential of games as transformative learning experiences for military design and reflexive leadership. Beaulieu-Brossard has also engaged in public discussions about military design through various platforms, including podcasts like "Battle Rhythm" by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, where he discussed military design and innovation.

James Greer:

Dr. James "Jim" Greer is a retired U.S. Army officer who served as Commandant of the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies along with many other positions and assignments. He currently has returned to the SAMS program as faculty, and is involved in the military design movement. Dr. Greer has lectured and written on the topic, and provides mentorship to students at Fort Leavenworth while also engaging with the military design community through the AoD community of design theorists.

Nations Involved in the Military Design Movement

United States:

The U.S. Army formally introduced design in its Field Manual 5-0, "The Operations Process," in 2010, emphasizing design as part of operational planning. Prior to this, design theory operated in an informal and highly theoretical manner, often through research and experimentation at select advanced military schools where Shimon Naveh and other design theorists were contracted to provide education.

In 2015-2016, the United States Special Operations Command contracted Naveh and several other systemic operational design theorists to provide tailored SOD education at the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida. JSOU provided SOD education briefly, with the Naveh group dismissed shortly after certain disagreements on education and policy. JSOU then developed a range of SOCOM design methodologies in 2016-2022, including a shortened interpretation of Army Design Methodology re-branded "The SOCOM Design Way." This also was removed from the curriculum soon after several experimentations suggested that methodology was oversimplified and too similar to the U.S. Army method. Designers Ben Zweibelson and Nathan Schwagler led a multi-disciplinary design approach at JSOU from 2016-2022 using a more flexible framework that drew from a wider range of design constructs and methods.

Israel:

Through Shimon Naveh's work, Israel has been at the forefront, particularly with SOD. The Israeli Defense Forces have experimented with design thinking in military applications since the late 1990s, with various phases of design development and other periods of design disinterest or rejection.

Canada:

The Canadian military, particularly at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, has incorporated military design into their education since 2013. The Canadian non-profit 'Archipelago of Design' or AoD has since 2016 operated as an international network of military design educators, theorists, uniformed military participants, and advocates of design thinking. The Archipelago of Design hosts an annual design conference originally called the 'Innovations Methodologies for Defence Challenges" or IMDC, now re-branded 'Security by Design'. Prior to the formation of the Canadian non-profit design group, a small group of design cadre worked within the Canadian Forces College to formalize design courseware in the 2015-2019 period. Dr. Paul Mitchell, a professor at the Canadian Forces College, championed that effort and has written and lectured on how the Canadian military began to incorporate formal design education through trial and error.

The first IMDC conference occurred in 2018 in Ottawa, Canada, at the Saint Paul University in conjunction with the Canadian Forces College and the AoD community. Several videos are available online of the panel events where participants from a variety of nations and militaries discussed military design theory and practice. In 2017, the first proto-conference occured in Montreal hosted by the Royal Military College at Saint Jean, led by then Commandant (curently Major General) Simon Bernard. This conference was called the "Military Innovation Symposium" and occurred in April 2017.

Australia:

The Australian Defence Forces have also integrated design thinking into some of their military doctrine and practices, notably through its Future Land Warfare Branch. Dr. Alex Ryan is an Australian educator and designer who taught with Shimon Naveh at the School for Advanced Military Studies in the United States in the mid-2000s, later moving to Canada and continuing design applications for the Canadian government and in civilian contexts.

United Kingdom:

The British military has explored design concepts, though to a lesser extent compared to the U.S. or Israel.

Interaction with Traditional Military Decision-Making

Complementary Role: Military design does not necessarily replace traditional military decision-making processes like the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) but complements them by combining the linear, sequential planning methodologies with a range of alternative constructs. These include combining civilian or commercial design methods within the military frameworks, resulting in unorthodox and adaptive variations. Special Forces retired Green Beret, Dr. Grant Martin, has lectured and published on this intersection between commercial design thinking and military (specifically in special operations contexts) applications. Some in the military design movement charge traditional military institutions with peforming a 'pseudo-science' rather than an actual, scientifically rigorous treatment of war, and only through design thinking might contemporary defense organizations break free from these limitations.

Framing Problems: Design helps in re-framing complex problems in ways that might not be obvious through traditional analysis, fostering a deeper understanding of the operational environment.

Innovation: It encourages innovative thinking and solutions that might not emerge from strictly hierarchical or linear planning models. Innovation is considered a disruptive, dynamic process that cannot be categorized into standard steps or some set method, according to part of the military design movement. Others within the movement do posit that some institutionalization of set design steps can complement and enhance existing military decision-making without dismantling or destroying the existing doctrines and beliefs.

Adaptability: Design thinking promotes adaptability, which is crucial in modern, rapidly changing conflict scenarios. Designers tend to challenge the existing military planning methodologies as too rigid and tied to the physical sciences, where complex warfare requires different forms of thinking. The 'logical positivism' charged by designers toward the military planning community must be tempered, as design theorists argue, through challenging such constructs at the ontological and epistemological level.

Military designers frequently draw from commercial design methods, although these are not entirely reproduced within military practices. Instead, military designers attempt to bridge the two disciplines, combining some constructs while marginalizing others. Many commercial design theorists have interacted with military organizations over the years, including IBM, where 'Enterprise Design Thinking' is used within IBM as their preferred design methodology.

Contemporary Challenges for the Movement

Cultural Resistance: There's often resistance within traditional military cultures that value certainty, hierarchy, and established procedures. Design's embrace of ambiguity and iterative processes can clash with these norms.

Implementation: Integrating design into the rigid frameworks of military operations can be challenging, requiring education, cultural change, and new evaluation metrics. Military designers frequently face student rejection of certain design concepts, along with challenges from faculty, doctrine writers, and traditionalists that see little or no value in the disruptive and irregular activities featured in design thinking.

Process Integration: Design often starts the process by questioning assumptions, exploring the nature of the problem, and envisioning possible futures before traditional planning steps like course of action development in MDMP.

In essence, military design seeks to enhance strategic and operational effectiveness by introducing a more creative, adaptive, and reflective approach to military strategy, which can lead to more nuanced and effective military operations in complex, dynamic environments.