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March 1, 2004Featured article candidateNot promoted

Seurat’s 2019 assertion seems incorrect (propaganda)

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The assertion of Mrs. Leila Seurat in her 2019 book (The Foreign Policy of Hamas, cited or paraphrased in our lead section of Hamas, third paragraph, sentence ‘While initially…’), as that Hamas in a 2006 accord signed with Fatah (and also in agreements in 2005 and in 2007) “accept[ed] the 1967 borders…”, seems not correct. I hate to say this, but this assertion seems some sort of propaganda.

How does Wikipedia generally (have to) handle, deal with, this type of propaganda? I say Seurat’s allegation is not correct, because we have extensive and clear information about that 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, including the certified text of that agreement itself, and that document appears not to say ‘acceptance of the 1967 borders’ or anything comparable. (Exactly the same objections I hold against Seurat’s remarks about the 2005+2007 agreements.)

As far as I’ve gotten to know Mr. Vice regent, who has entered this quote of Mrs. Seurat in the article, he will defend the assertion of Seurat by quoting (a lot) more authors who make the same or a similar assertion. But that wouldn’t convince me much: even if incorrect propaganda is disseminated (or echoed) by many more adherents, it would still remain incorrect propaganda. Therefore my appeal on or question to the Wiki community further than only Vice regent: how must we deal with this sort of incorrect (propagandistic) assertion?

By the way: authors Baconi(2018) and Roy(2013), also cited in our lead section of Hamas, make (partly) the same allegation(s) as Seurat, which is only an example of what I said above: Mr Vice regent will bring other authors to our attention who make the same assertion; but repeating an incorrect assertion to my idea doesn’t make it less incorrect. Also by the way: I realize, that this new stance of mine implies that I have to correct, on one detail, my latest proposal for replacing that lead sentence: ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:38, 30 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Corriebertus, let's be precise. Seurat says on p. 199 that Singned by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, the Prisoners’ Document implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders. The document itself says
The word 'implicitly' definitely does a lot of work in Seurat's statement, but I can sort of see how it follows from the document's text. In the article we attribute this to Seurat in the section 2006–2007: 1967 borders and a truce rather than stating it as fact. Can you clarify what makes you think that the statement is incorrect? Alaexis¿question? 20:45, 30 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Also, it's become quite confusing to navigate all the sections on these talk page (this could've been partially my fault), do you think we can discuss the prisoners' document, its significance and interpretations here and close the old thread (Do the 2005-07 agreements...)? Alaexis¿question? 20:49, 30 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your contribution and ideas. You speak of a quote of Seurat on her p. 199, and about our section 2006--2007 where she is cited with yet another quote (p. 47). I'm not taking issue here with our text in section 2006–2007: 1967 borders and a truce nor with Seurat's p. 199 (which quote I had never even seen), but with Seurat's quote on her pp. 17-19: "its acceptance of the 1967 borders" which is alleged as source for our mentioned sentence in the lead section. I’ve explained here on 30 Jan. what’s incorrect about that quote of hers (pp. 17–19): what Seurat there alleges about the 2006 agreement is simply not stated in that agreement.
By the way (if I'd react on that quote on p. 199 of Seurat, which was unknown to me until now): the Hamas's document's phrase: “all territories occupied in 1967”, in the view of Hamas, might very well mean to include Haifa, Tel Aviv, Galilee, Beersheba in other words all Israel; in that case, viewing the 2006 document from the viewpoint of Hamas (as we should!), there’s NO GROUND AT ALL for Seurat (thus it would also be incorrect, unfounded, for her) to speak of “(implicitly) recognized the June 1967 borders” in the sense of: accepting a state on only West Bank and Gaza, by Hamas in that 2006 document (perhaps later but not in this document). This bending, spinning the document's intention, by Seurat, ignoring the viewpoint from which the document is written and signed by Hamas, then would be wishfull thinking, and in political discussions I think (and am afraid) the correct term for such bending the truth is propaganda. Mind you, also, that Seurat, as far as we know now, does not give a direct quotation from the 2006 document for her stance of “implicitly recognized…”: that would seem to me a grave omission, making her book more of a (propagandistic) pamphlet than a scientifically useful, reliable, contribution to our knowledge of the positions of Hamas. In that case, we should base ourselves in Wikipedia on the document itself, not on this (wishful) twisting of it by Seurat (and the authors echoing or preceding her with this or a comparable stance). --Corriebertus (talk) 08:07, 1 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Corriebertus I'm sorry what? Might very well mean to include??? You want to change what is clearly stated and reflected in reliable sources because you have a sneaking suspicion that actually what Hamas really meant by all territories occupied in 1967 isn't what it says but actually all of historic Palestine pre-1967? That's not how Wikipedia works. Unless you have convincing evidence from reliable sources about this that are not fringe, and you will need a lot of them because it is an extreme claim to suggest that what is plainly stated and reflected in reliable sources actually had a secret hidden meaning behind it...rendering all those reliable sources from respected scholars actually "propaganda"...is an extreme claim. Otherwise we say what the reliable sources say. Smallangryplanet (talk) 18:02, 2 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Smallangryplanet: “all territories occupied in 1967” is exactly what it says, I don’t deny that – but it is rather vague, don’t you agree? Does it include Tibet? parts of Eastern Ukraine[wrong example, admitted by CB, --Corriebertus (talk) 08:26, 4 February 2025 (UTC)] ? Probably not when it stands in a Hamas-Fatah agreement. But why would it have to be limited to West Bank and Gaza Strip, as our colleague Alaexis (and author Leila Seurat) suggests? That is their own (narrow) interpretation. They are, like everyone, entitled to their own prejudices, ideas and presumptions, but Wikipedia should not mistake them for facts. Therefore, these Seurat quotes (pp. 17–19 and p. 199), being merely opinions/presumptions/interpretations of Seurat, can’t be used in any Wikipedia article as stating what exactly those ‘all territories occupied in 1967’ are; that’s all I was arguing here on 1 Feb., 08:07. (By the way, Hamas, as we all should know, considers [incorrect claim, admitted by CB,--Corriebertus (talk) 08:26, 4 February 2025 (UTC)] might consider all[new text, --Corriebertus (talk) 08:26, 4 February 2025 (UTC)] Israel (“the Zionist entity”) as an “occupation” of Palestinian land: see their ‘revised charter’ of 2017, articles 19 and 20: “Whatever has befallen the land of Palestine in terms of occupation, settlement building, Judaization or changes to its features or falsification of facts is illegitimate”, dixit Hamas.) I suppose there exist some more ‘sources’ that interprete “all territories occupied in 1967” the way Seurat does; for whatever reason, they all want to convince their readers that Hamas gives up its claim on the territory that is currently known as the state of Israel. All I’m saying is, they have and they show no corroboration for that (narrow) interpretation. --Corriebertus (talk) 21:03, 3 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Corriebertus, as long as it's your (or mine) interpretation against something published by a scholar, I'm afraid it's not enough to challenge the current text of the article. It would be best to find more sources that interpret these events differently, then we can mention both views per WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 19:41, 2 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis: Even ‘scholars’ can make unscientific guesses/interpretations. We, (scientific!?) Wiki editors, should be clever enough to recognize those two quotes of Seurat as (wishful) guesses as to what Hamas would have said in an agreement with Fatah: Seurat fails to give any direct quote from that Hamas-Fatah agreement (such agreements are made public in their literal wording, exactly to prevent people to give misinterpretations to them!). (By the way, you say “these events”, I presume you mean “Hamas agreements”? ) --Corriebertus (talk) 09:32, 4 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Corriebertus we have a policy that explicitly bans WP:Original research, you know.
Yes, I referred to the signing of all these agreements by Hamas. They must have been analysed by other scholars as well. If they don't support Seurat, great, you can use them in the article. If not, perhaps your interpretation is incorrect, or maybe it's an instance of systemic bias, about which we cannot do much, by design of Wikipedia. Alaexis¿question? 20:36, 4 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis: All right then, you admit that it is an interpretation of Seurat (‘accept 1967 borders…’). But then, a Wiki lead section should not ‘sell’ that interpretation as if it is a rocksteady fact – as our lead section currently does. --Corriebertus (talk) 23:45, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
(By the way: the thread 'Do the 2005-07 agreements...' has been useful, and has, by coincidence, just an hour ago been archived by Lowercase sigmabot III, which is fine by me. By the way: there's nothing wrong with citing those 2005-07 agreements in our article, on correct places and with 'due weight', but the new problem what I started this new thread here for, is my discovery that Seurat seems to interpret/represent the 2006 document wrongly.) --Corriebertus (talk) 13:35, 1 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Corriebertus, I'm finding your objections to be an unnecessary time sink. First you questioned whether RS said Hamas accepted the 1967 borders, even though I (and others) provided lots of quotes that they did. Then you claimed those RS are wrong, even as you admitted "(a lot) more authors who make the same or a similar assertion" – one or two RS can be wrong, but how can "a lot" of RS saying the same thing be wrong? But, ok fine, so the users in this thread looked up the original sources. After looking at the original source, it seems Hamas did agree to a state, in 2006, "on all territories occupied in 1967". So now you're claiming that, according to Hamas, Haifa wasn't conquered by Israel until 1967? Has Hamas ever said that? The concept of the 1967 borders is well-known and besides small deviations (eg Latrun), there is no real dispute on their existence. Can we focus on other ways of improving this article? VR (Please ping on reply) 22:37, 2 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Vice regent: Seurat contends (in a 2019 book) that a 2006 agreement “accept[ed] the 1967 borders…”. But she does not even give a quote from that document which is in the public domain, to prove that claim. That’s not a regular, reliable, scientific, method to present reliable facts, is it? The document itself, furthermore, does not appear to make that statement. So, I wonder: who exactly has decided that this Mrs. Seurat is reliable on all pages of all of her publications? By the way: I’m not claiming that Haifa was conquered in 1967, I’m claiming that Hamas considers [incorrect claim, admitted by CB,--Corriebertus (talk) 08:26, 4 February 2025 (UTC)] might also consider[new text, --Corriebertus (talk) 08:26, 4 February 2025 (UTC)] Haifa (etc.) as occupied Palestinian land: see a few paragraphs higher here, in my reply to Smallangryplanet with the same date stamp. --Corriebertus (talk) 21:03, 3 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Most academic works give citations but don't always provide the full quote; nothing "unscientific" about that. And the document clearly references the 1967 borders, as Alaexis showed above.VR (Please ping on reply) 02:48, 4 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Vice regent: No no no, the 2006 document does not mention ‘1967 borders’(in the meaning of West Bank+Gaza), and Alaexis did not (could not) “show above” that it did – Alaexis pointed only at “all territories occupied in 1967” which can have different interpretations (as I explained 1 and 3 Feb.) of wich Seurat AND Alaexis chose the one that they personally prefer. Perhaps it’s not rightout ‘unscientific’ what Seurat does, but more important is, that her interpretations (“implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders”, "its acceptance of the 1967 borders") are arbitrary, subjective (biased) choices for interpreting Hamas-phrases that can be understood differently; see my explanations here on 1 and 3 Feb. --Corriebertus (talk) 09:32, 4 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    @Vice regent: And by the way: just repeating an argument from someone (Alaexis, 30Jan2025,20:45) that has already been contradicted by me(1Feb,08:07), while (bluntly) ignoring that given contradiction, seems no longer respectful or constructive discussion --Corriebertus (talk) 12:23, 10 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Why do you think it's incorrect? It's in accord with numerous other quotes and citations for Hamas' position from that period, and with plenty of other analysis of their overall position. Keep in mind that we're only saying that Seurat says that Hamas implicitly recognized those borders in that particular agreement at that particular time - you express skepticism above that Hamas would have actually honored that, and while we can't just put your own personal skepticism in the article, we do note their contradicting statements from later on further down, and the variety of interpretations this has resulted in. When there's disagreement among the sources (or when someone puts out inconsistent statements), all we can do is document it. For example, we have quotes saying Writing for Middle Eastern Studies, Imad Alsoos says that Hamas has both a short and long-term objective: "The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety and In 2009, Taghreed El-khodary and Ethan Bronner wrote in the New York Times, that Hamas' position is that it doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist, but is willing to accept as a compromise a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. But note that these do not contradict Seurat; ie. Hamas taking the position Seurat says it does at that period in time is compatible with this - Seurat says "Hamas implicitly accepted this in this document", not "Hamas would definitely honor this implication in the long term" - at the same time, Alsoos, El-khodary, and Bronner are all clearly describing a reality where Hamas was at least making some conciliatory noises (as Seurat says), they just disagree on why and what its long-term goals are. I think that the Comments from non-Hamas-members section could stand to be improved a bit (some people we're citing lack expertise, and some parts are just poorly-worded) but it gets the general point across that, yes, people share your skepticism; we still have to include quotes like Seurat's because without that we wouldn't be providing any context for what these people are skeptical of. And, of course, there are also scholars who are less skeptical, which we have to note as well if they're of roughly equal weight. --Aquillion (talk) 12:44, 10 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Aquillion: Please read the whole discussion, not only my starting statement which has already been shaded and qualified. Firstly, Seurat is not reporting a fact about the 2006 Agreement etc. but an interpretation: that is confirmed by colleagues Alaexis here on 30 January and by VR here on 4 Feb.. Secondly, the challenged Wikipedia lead sentence does not even correctly paraphrase Seurat’s personal interpretation: our sentence tells (by using that grammatical form) that Hamas in 2005 dropped their initial goal (overthrowing Israel) for the long term, which is not what Seurat, even in her (loose) interpretation, asserts or guesses.
Aq, your representation here of Seurat’s statement looks (at first glance) a whole lot better—perhaps even acceptable for our article somewhere—than the challenged current presentation in our lead section. The mayor problem (read our whole discussion!) is just, that Wiki now contends (by that grammatical construction), that since 2005 onwards, Hamas definitely (and not only ‘implicitly’) settled for the 1967-bordered state.
Ofcourse you are right, that voices contradicting (disagreeing with) Seurat’s interpretation have already found their place in the article; that’s not my criticism nor scepticism, my criticism is that Seurat’s quote is now bent and misused to ‘say’ (in wiki voice!) much more than Seurat says (as her personal interpretation).
Seurat’s pp. 17–19 quote should perhaps be placed in that subsection ‘Comments’, the lead should give a clearer, more correct, summary of section ‘Policies towards Israel and Palestine’. (p.s. If you had given me an alert (@Corriebertus:) I would have found your posting a bit earlier. ) --Corriebertus (talk) 08:22, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, but none of what you're saying here is correct. If your objection is to this sentence in the lead While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007 - Seurat is an expert stating a fact in a high-quality source; the other sources support that as well; it accurately summarizes the body; nor have you produced any sources that actually contradict it (instead, you seem to be relying on your own personal interpretation of primary documents.) Treaties are complex; we rely on expert sources to interpret them and say what they mean. We then report that meaning, as covered in the sources, as fact unless there's evidence of disagreement over it in sources of comparable weight - and your personal belief that the sources are wrong obviously isn't enough. And for the record your assertion that the article says that since 2005 onwards, Hamas definitely (and not only ‘implicitly’) settled for the 1967-bordered state is wrong; we only say that it did so in the listed agreements, which all the sources are in agreement on and which is simple uncontroversial fact - it is a much narrower statement than you seem to be reading it as. These are individual points in a longer timeline, as the article makes extremely clear in the very next sentence. What sources disagree on is whether these agreements were trustworthy, not what they say. You've written an absolutely massive amount in this section without convincing anyone (despite it being, at a glance, a WP:1AM scenario); at this point you need to WP:DROPTHESTICK. If you're absolutely convinced that your arguments are strong enough to convince a larger audience you could start an RFC (but see the similar one above that failed to go anywhere first); aside from that we're just going in circles. --Aquillion (talk) 12:35, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Aquillion: “[N]one of what you're saying here is correct” (meaning ‘you are a complete idiot’) is an infamous insult, for which I expect apologies. (If I don’t get them I won’t answer you here again.) Perhaps there are democratic countries where insulting rhetoric gets you elected into the highest office of state, but I had hoped that in the Wikipedia communty we still adhere to a degree of politeness. In expectance of your apologies, I’ll read your insult as: ‘there’s a lot in your posting that is incorrect [to my (Aq) opinion]’.
I doubt whether you’ve read the (whole) discussion. Already 30 Jan I’ve told you/everybody why I consider Seurat’s assertion incorrect, so there’s no point in you asking me that. You however (10 Feb) defend Seurat’s correctness by pointing at ‘other quotes over Hamas’s position in that period, and analyses of their overall position’ which is beside the point, I’m only challenging the fact that Seurat ‘reads’ something in the 2006 Document what’s not in THAT document. You say: “we're only saying that Seurat says that Hamas implicitly recognized those borders in that particular agreement”, that’s very untrue: the quote I’m challenging (referred to in our lead section, Seurat pp. 17–19: “its acceptance of the 1967 borders…”) certainly doesn’t contain the word nor the concept “implicitly”. So you are distorting Seurat’s quote, distorting my ‘reproach’ to Seurat, and then tell me my reproach is incorrect. The name for such rhetorical go-about is: fallacy of attacking a straw man. My criticism thus has nothing to do with my own eventual ideas (‘skepticism’ etc.) about Hamas’s positions, as you presumed.
In your 14 Feb post, I see a lot that seems dubious, incorrect, or beside the point.
1. Perhaps most important is this: “we only say that it did so [= ‘Hamas… settled for the 1967-bordered state’] in the listed agreements, which all the sources are in agreement on and which is simple uncontroversial fact - it is a much narrower statement than you seem to be reading it as.” Sorry, but please take notice of the grammatical construction: “While initially … it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements … in 2005, 2006 and 2007”. This structure undeniably builds a contrast between a position in 1988–2004 and a changed position in 2005 onwards. That new (2005) position (‘accept those borders’ INSTEAD of seeking a larger Pal state) is not again being referred to in the LEAD section, so the reader who only reads the lead section, must, from logical linguistic grounds (for whom only Wikipedia is responsible, not Seurat or anyone else), conclude that from then onwards Hamas has stuck to that new position. If that is NOT what Wikipedia wants him to conclude – and THAT seems your stance(“Seurat says … not "Hamas would definitely honor this implication in the long term"”(10 Feb)) – then Wikpedia should not use that grammatical (‘while initially…’) structure that IMPELS the reader to conclude so.
2. Secondly: my ‘case’ here started with saying that Seurat is wrong, the 2006 document doesn’t state: ‘…accept those borders’. You say: yes, the document does so, as is mentioned “in the body”. Where? It is not in our body. You also say: Seurat is an expert, “the other sources”(Baconi,Roy?) support it also, therefore it is true; “Treaties are complex; we rely on expert sources to interpret them and say what they mean.” But I’m not challenging the interpretation of the treaty, I challenge the reading of it. All of us who have learned to master the English language to a sufficient level (that is, most people of age 15 or older who’ve gone to school in a ‘Western world’-country) can read this treaty; perhaps some phrases in it are mysterious (“Abide by the decree of God and…”) but any 15-year-old can scan the document on ‘accept the 1967 borders’ and find it not. Who has decided that this treaty is “(too) complex” for the citizen to read? Sounds like opportunist bluff of yours. By the way, the fact that this ‘accept…borders’ is NOT in the treaty is already admitted by our colleagues Alaexis(30Jan) and VR(4Feb): they admit it is Seurat’s interpretation. In that case we should make clear in the Wiki text that it is only an interpretation (then I wouldn’t protest any longer); otherwise Wikipedia is indoctrinating the reader to take an interpretation for a rocksteady fact.
3. Point three: you say, I fail to convince anyone, therefore should drop the stick. I didn’t start out to convince, I started out asking you guys how we normally handle a situation like this. Your answer is: I (Aq) agree with the current wiki lead section, therefore I argue that it correctly represents Seurat pp. 17-19(what it obviously does not, as I argue today), argue that Seurat tells a fact(what two colleagues have already denied and any 15-year-old can authoritatively deny), and that Seurat plus Baconi+Roy have some monopoly on truth(no comment needed). Alaexis admits, Seurat is ‘interpreting’ “all territories occupied in 1967” into: ‘1967 borders’; therefore I’ve asked him today, if we shouldn’t make that clear to our readers. VR resorts (bluntly) to incorrect reasoning and ignoring my contradicting his arguments(=disrespectful), which I’ve accused him of(10Feb), which he deigns not to react on. --Corriebertus (talk) 00:32, 15 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with @Aquillion. The source in question clearly satisfies the criteria of being RS, having been published by a reputable academic publisher by reputable scholars who are experts on the topic. Saying that it is spreading "propaganda" and should therefore not be used as RS on the page violates WP:RS and WP:DUE. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:04, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Evolution of positions: 2017–6 Oct. 2023 (new charter)

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In 2017 Hamas published "A Document of General Principles and Policies" which some consider to be their new charter. Subsequently various Hamas leaders made various statements about Hamas's policy towards Israel. Now in the article we quote Hamas's finance minister who said that a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. Others struck a less conciliatory tone, for instance in October 2017 Yahya Sinwar dismissed the demands for the recognition of Israel and added that the organisation was debating when to wipe it out.[1][2][3] To be fair, he also said in interviews to western media that Hamas didn't want a war with Israel (see references here).

Mentioning only one type of statements and ignoring the other is a violation of WP:NPOV. Sinwar was the leader of Hamas in Gaza and therefore a much more senior figure, so there is no justification for ignoring his words while mentioning the opinion of the finance minister. How do you think we should describe all that in this section?

Let's see if we can reach an agreement here or an RfC is needed. Alaexis¿question? 21:41, 13 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Statements made to his Palestinian people (Sinwar's conference in Gaza) trump statements to an audience that is not his own people. I would note that even according to the 2017 Hamas charter (intended for a Western audience too, published in English and in ararbic), the demand for control from the sea to the river remains. A state within the 1967 borders is a step. 2A0D:6FC0:707:E800:B4AD:7D0E:D889:E15E (talk) 09:03, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The quote ("a long-term...") is based on the member of a pro-Palestinian think tank. Every term has a different meaning, so when a politician chooses a term, it has a meaning. A two-state solution (not two-state settlement) means ending the conflict, not a ceasefire or an armistice. 2A0D:6FC0:707:E800:B4AD:7D0E:D889:E15E (talk) 09:18, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Please note that per WP:ARBECR you're only allowed to make edit requests. If you want to participate you must satisfy the extended-confirmed criteria. Alaexis¿question? 20:20, 14 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I oppose the addition of the Sinwar 2017 line – it was contradicted by Sinwar himself shortly thereafter. I would also oppose the inclusion of the second statement from 2018 where he is very conciliatory and says he wants no war and repeats the offer of a hudna or long-term ceasefire. Including both serves no purpose here.
The finance minister statement is however a different situation. As far as I am aware, he did not contradict himself, which would be relevant information to add. Also, it is in line with what many RS say is the position of Hamas in relation to recognising Israel, so it does not stand by itself as some aberration making it not WP:DUE.
The section is fine as is. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:12, 19 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
When Sinwar or other Hamas leaders say contradicting things, you can't say that one statement is true and worthy of inclusion and the other is untrue and should be ignored. This would be WP:OR. Alaexis¿question? 23:03, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
By the way, Hamas are known to employ different discourse for the domestic vs western audience (see Hamas and the Media Politics and strategy by Wael Abdelal, p. 178), so Sinwar making different statements when talking to foreign media is actually a good illustration of this phenomenon. Alaexis¿question? 23:26, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
No, @Alaexis, you are the one who wants to include only one of the Sinwar statements because it seems like you believe it contradicts what is said by the finance minister, even though Sinwar himself then made another statement contradicting his prior one, whereas the finance minister's statement has not been contradicted by himself, and is in line with the RS described official position of Hamas. This would be WP:OR and also violate WP:NPOV.
There is, however, a more significant problem with your proposed addition of the Sinwar statement. When you look at the original source (which the Times of Israel cites) – the Shehab News article – Sinwar's reference to "wiping out Israel" is part of a broader statement about his unwillingness to accept the Quartet's demand for Hamas to give up its arms, recognise Israel, and disband as an organization:
Sinwar responded to the seven conditions of the Israeli cabinet for Palestinian reconciliation, and the statement of Jason Greenblatt, the US envoy for peace in the Middle East, that Hamas must accept the conditions of the Quartet and renounce what he called "terrorism," recognize "Israel," disarm, return the Israelis held in Gaza, and sever its relationship with Hamas. Sinwar said in response: “No one can force us to abide by their conditions, and reconciliation is a purely Palestinian issue that no one is allowed to have a hand in,” adding: “Disarming Hamas is ‘Satan’s dream of heaven,’ and no one can disarm us, and not a minute of the day or night passes without us accumulating our strength.” He continued: "The time has passed when Hamas discussed the issue of recognizing Israel, and the discussion now is about when we will wipe out "Israel," noting that his movement has never been a "terrorist movement," and "but rather we are revolutionaries fighting for our people and their just cause."
The rest of the article includes Sinwar stating his willingness to engage in the reconciliation talks and agreements with Fatah, and also to engage in further negotiations with the Israelis.
The Times of Israel piece, after taking the "wiping Israel out" quote out of this context, later also adds that it was part of a broader statement about forcefully rejecting the US' and Israeli demand for disarming, disbanding and recognising Israel: "No one in the universe can disarm us. On the contrary, we will continue to have the power to protect our citizens,” Sinwar said, according to the official statement."
The rest of the article also discusses Sinwar's support for continuing reconciliation talks with Fatah, and the continued talks with Israel.
So, let's think about this some more. Your added sentence seems to me to be WP:CHERRYPICKING, to say nothing of it being contradicted by Sinwar himself shortly thereafter in an official interview w/r/t his and Hamas' policy rather than a speech given to supporters that mostly consists of him talking about the reconciliation process and talks with Israel.
Now let's have a look at your point about rhetoric changing based on the audience being addressed. This is actually counter to the argument you are trying to make. As RS often note, Sinwar and other Hamas leaders, as with all political leaders, employ inflated rhetoric in speeches aimed at their own base, but - and stick with me here - this is not 1:1 with their actual long-standing policy positions as laid out in policy documents and official statements.
You want to make a passing, out of context statement from a speech – shortly afterwards contradicted in an interview laying out official Hamas policy – seem equally or even more significant in value than actual official policy statements from officials. These are statements that have not been contradicted by the speakers and are in line with longstanding official Hamas policy as determined by RS. This would not only violate WP:NPOV, but also WP:DUE. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:41, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
It's your opinion that the inflated rhetoric aimed at their own base is less representative of their true objectives than things they write in policy documents. My opinion is different, but it's irrelevant. If Sinwar said one thing to an audience in Gaza and then another thing to an Italian newspaper we should report both. Especially since the former was noticed by well-known newspapers and at least one scholarly book.
If you think that my version lacked context, then please propose a different non-cherrypicked wording and we can discuss it. Alaexis¿question? 12:47, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
That's not my view. I'm saying that a passing comment from a random speech to "Gazan youth", specifically in reference to Israeli demands to disarm and disband, in the midst of a speech that includes accepting reconciliation with Fatah and the Oslo camp as well as negotiations with Israel, is clearly not WP:DUE. It is directly contradicted by Sinwar himself in an interview laying out his and Hamas' official policy shortly after, as well as official policy statements from the broader Hamas leadership – as reflected in RS.
Adding the full context of the Sinwar quote with all relevant caveats and the fact that he said the exact opposite shortly thereafter – in a section that is about Truce proposals – is, again, not relevant and fails WP:DUE, so I oppose its inclusion. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:33, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Then it looks like we'll need an RfC regarding the proper weight given to various utterances made by Hamas leaders in 2017-2018 after they published ther new charter. Alaexis¿question? 21:26, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with @Smallangryplanet. If the statement of the finance minister which is in line with the established position of Hamas as reiterated repeatedly is to be questioned as is @Alaexis's aim with this edit, it requires a source that is able to do so. This is not the case with the line from the Sinwar speech that is taken out of context and subsequently clarified both in the cited speech itself and in the later statement. I do not see the purpose of putting all this information with all the context on the page, let alone in the truce proposals section where it is not relevant at all, when it fails to meet its stated objective of undermining the statement from the finance minister that is in line with the known Hamas position. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:59, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ "Hamas chief: We won't discuss recognizing Israel, only wiping it out". The Times of Israel. 9 October 2017. Retrieved 10 February 2025.
  2. ^ "السنوار يتحدث عمّا دار في حوارات القاهرة ويرد على شروط الاحتلال وأميركا" (in Arabic). Shehab News. 19 October 2017. Retrieved 10 February 2025.
  3. ^ Hussein AlAhmad, Stabilizing Authoritarianism, p.144 (Palgrave Macmillan)

Alaexis¿question? 21:41, 13 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Dear @Alaexis: I have constructed all those chronological subsections, quite a while ago, simply by organizing chronologically what was already given in the, at that moment, very chaotic and unreadable section ‘Policies towards Israel’ (perhaps bearing a slightly different heading, then). I had no intention to give that finance minister more attention than Mr. Sinwar, nor to “ignore” Sinwar; there just was no information at that time in that section about statements of Sinwar. So please, and at a hurry, add the relevant statements of Sinwar to that subsection. (Don’t start talk page discussions for such simple edit suggestions, because there will always show up people who search and search until they find a ‘reason’ to thwart your sensible edit. Just do it.) --Corriebertus (talk) 20:45, 18 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I definitely didn't and don't blame you for mentioning the statement made by the finance minister. Myself, I am not against mentioning his words, as long as they are given due weight.
These changes were reverted once already, so I've tried to explain myself here. If it doesn't work, I'll request external feedback. Alaexis¿question? 23:30, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Edit request 15 February 2025

[edit]

Description of suggested change:

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.[37] But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007[106]) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side.[107][93] Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.[108][109][110] Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.[111][112][113][114][115]
+
Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.[37] But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007[106]) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side.[107][93] another option is to accept them as temporary borders, for the purpose of extending them to the full territory of Mandatory Palestine. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.[108][109][110]+

change from: Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.[37] But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007[106]) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side.[107][93] Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.[108][109][110] Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.[111][112][113][114][115]

to:

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.[37] But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007[106]) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side.[107][93] another option is to accept them as temporary borders, for the purpose of extending them to the full territory of Mandatory Palestine. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.[108][109][110]

SOURCES for add: 1. 2017 charter [1]: "Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded, irrespective of the causes, the circumstances and the pressures and no matter how long the occupation lasts. Hamas rejects any alternative to the *full and complete* liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, ...67 part...

2. at podcast[2][3]: "Mishaal said that the "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle opened the horizon of political visions, and emphasized that the term "two-state solution" was rejected by the movement that wants an independent Palestinian state that will be freed from occupation from the sea to the river, and there is no way to return to that."

3.Mkhaimer Abusada, a political scientist at Al Azhar University, wrote in 2008 that Hamas talks "of hudna [temporary ceasefire], not of peace or reconciliation with Israel. They believe over time they will be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine."[105] Some scholars have noted that alongside offering a long-term truce, Hamas retains its objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. SOURCE: Alsoos, Imad (2021). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. S2CID 234860010. 4. https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-580660 . and possible: Joseph S. Spoerl, Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism, Jewish Political Studies Review 31, 2020, pp. 210–244.

5. On September 27, 2023, the Gazan journalist Mustafa Sawaf, affiliated with Hamas, wrote an article on the website of the military wing Al-Qassam under the title: "Before time runs out, take your legs and leave." In the article itself, he writes: "To the Zionists and especially the settlers in the Gaza Envelope, prepare yourselves for the departure of the Strip. This will be the first departure, but leave your suitcases closed and do not open them, prepare for the final departure of Palestine so that you do not have to rearrange them. The departure is coming and it is closer than you imagine." LINKs: [4], [5].

6. On 19 Oct 2017, Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, said: “Over is the time Hamas spent discussing recognizing Israel. Now Hamas will discuss when we will wipe out Israel,” [[6]] [[7]]

7. In 2021, at the conference, Sinwar speaks about a Palestinian state from the sea to the river. [[8]],[[9]] [[10]]

remove: "Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza" or sources becore:

1. The first source is a book by the *journalist" Peter Beinart, but when I enter p. 219, n.53 is not displayed. That is, the reader cannot know if the comment is related to this topic. This comment is probably also a reference to another article.

2. The second source, which deals mainly with Palestinian and Israeli women, does not exactly make a comparison between Likud and Hamas (which later expressed official support for the two-state solution in a declared manner, through the Bar Ilan speech and previously promoted the Oslo process by withdrawing. Yes, I know that there were claims against its intentions, but Likud did not reach the level of statements and *actions* like Hamas. A better comparison is perhaps to Fatah.) The comparison was between Gush Emunim and Hamas (which ignores issues such as the use of the building as a struggle against the use of suicide bombers) while the secular Shamir's position stems from patriotism, not religion.

3. The third source is intended to present different opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is neither research nor fact-checking. For example, the source contains a lie: Likud stated in its 1999 platform that Israel's eastern border is the Jordan River, meaning that there are no demands related to the Jordan (Article 9 - https://www.idi.org.il/media/6001/likud-15.pdf ). It seems that the speaker did not read the platform at all. In the platform, Likud opposed a Palestinian state but supported self-government (autonomy. They may have relied on the autonomy plan from the days of Menachem Begin). Hamas opposed both Jewish autonomy and a Jewish state at that time. The Likud said in a later platform (page 6 - https://www.idi.org.il/media/6698/likud-18.pdf): "The Likud is ready to make concessions in exchange for peace, concessions such as those made by Menachem Begin during the peace agreement with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat" (evacuation of territories in exchange for peace. All of Sinai was evacuated). By the way, the Likud lost the 1999 elections.

4. The fourth source is based on the words of a director in a pro-Palestinian think tank (his views on the nature of Hamas rule in Gaza are mentioned in passing? Or on its violent struggle). I tried to find out where there is a comparison between the Likud and Hamas in relation to a Palestinian state in the original and I couldn't find it. The position presented by Netanyahu in those days is recognition of a Palestinian state as part of a permanent agreement (Bar Ilan speech) and recognition of a Jewish state, in addition to recognizing Israel's right to exist as the PLO. Hamas refuses to recognize a Jewish state or recognize Israel's right to exist.

5. There is no ability to read the content of the source and its content may be identical to the content of the podcast.

Diff: i add a sentance "nother option is to accept them as temporary borders, for the purpose of extending them to the territory of Mandatory Palestine.". i offer to remove "Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza" or remove part of sources because they wrong. I put a lot of effort into the reasoning behind the edit and would appreciate further elaboration 2A0D:6FC0:808:EF00:501B:466F:8BDD:9B41 (talk) 01:08, 15 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@2A0D:6FC0:808:EF00:501B:466F:8BDD:9B41: Your intentions may perhaps be laudable or deserving support, but this very long and chaotic 'proposal' is absolutely unreadable. Please, start all over, and first in a few short sentences explain to us what is wrong, in that section, to your idea; and why. --Corriebertus (talk) 20:29, 18 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I suggested 2 changes to the paragraph:
  • Adding a sentence describing the approach to the Fiya Hamas has not given up on its desire to take over Mandatory Palestine and sees the 1967 borders as temporary. I justified this in a list of sources.
  • Removing a sentence comparing it to Likud in light of the weakness of the sources I presented. They are incorrect.
2.55.30.47 (talk) 21:30, 18 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Your edit request is about section Hamas#Recognition of Israel -- why don't you clearly tell us that!?! This chaotic approach of yours is very annoying. By the way, the section has been edited a lot since your edit request. If you still disagree, I advise you to make a new request, but please, a lot simpler. Mind you: we Wikipedians are all volunteers; only if you make your request appealing and attractive someone will take the trouble to read it all and maybe honor your request. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:31, 19 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
 Not done: this is neither an uncontroversial improvement, nor one that are has consensus, I suggest you read WP:EDITXY to have a better idea of what an "uncontroversial improvement" is. M.Bitton (talk) 21:38, 19 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

MATHODS

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The Tulkarm Battalion of Hamas' military wing hinted this evening (Thursday) at its responsibility for the attempted combined IED attack in the Dan Bloc, and issued a statement stating that "the revenge of the martyrs will not be forgotten." The IEDs, weighing approximately 5 kilograms, were written in Arabic as "Revenge from Tulkarm." https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkoepwh5jx#autoplay — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A0D:6FC0:808:EF00:AD25:586A:ADBA:2386 (talk) 21:47, 20 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

This belongs to Gaza war, rather than to this article which is about Hamas in general. They made lots of attacks, we can't mention every single one here. Alaexis¿question? 23:32, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Removing a trivial but therefore suggestive sentence (pro-Hamas)

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@Smallangryplanet: I’ve attempted to remove the last sentence of section Hamas#Policies towards Israel and Palestine today, which runs:
“Many scholars saw Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders as a tacit acceptance of another entity on the other side while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.”
My given motivation seems clear: I don’t deny the truth of this statement but because it is trivial, it seems to stand here only as excuse to make a (trivial) compliment to Hamas, which is not our role or task. Twice this edit has been reverted by Smallangryplanet (first time on 14Feb) but twice he refuses to give a substantial reason disagreeing with my given motive. That seems to me contrary to the philosophy of Wikipedia, which is based on reason: acknowledged editors have a right to correct or alter articles, if they give a motivation. Now in his latest revert, Smp suggests I can’t edit this sentence because that edit was already “reverted and challenged”. No it was not ‘challenged’, it was only (bluntly) reverted. If we allow this practice of Smp (reverting without argument to contents) Wikipedia is no longer based on reason but on blunt conservatism of editors who feel comfortable with an existing text. He also declaims about “failed to obtain consensus for its removal in talk” – apparently wants this first discussed here. So, here I am, at your request, Smp (and others); so tell me now, at long last: what is incorrect in my given motivation? --Corriebertus (talk) 18:21, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Our "role" is to build an encyclopedia and not really to be pro- or anti- anyone. If it's trivially true and its truth is unlikely to be challenged I don't see a reason for removing it. If it's likely to be challenged, whether we should include it depends on whether it's present in reliable sources, and whether the balance of sources support it. Loki (talk) 19:51, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@LokiTheLiar said it before I could, thanks! Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:01, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Recognition of Israel - repeated removal of sources information

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Yet again the statement Other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine was removed even though it's supported by three reliable sources. We were left only with one viewpoint ([Hamas is] acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side) which is a violation of WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 22:58, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Please, names and numbers, Alaexis. Who are the villains who do such things? Are they for instance the individuals who frustrate also my attempts at improving the article, forcing me to start two talk sections here, one a few munutes ago, the other earlier today? If you don't name them, then why do you place this 'message' on this talk page? --Corriebertus (talk) 23:36, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
We should be debating issues rather than personalities. In any case the editor who removed this information responded below. Alaexis¿question? 12:37, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Right, that line got inadvertently cut out because you went against the agreed upon consensus version proposed by VR and added it to the page in the first paragraph here rather than where we agreed it would be. Have restored it there, along with the rest of the agreed upon VR version. Please stop removing the Marzouk and Usher RS-backed information that was in the consensus VR version. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:03, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for adding it to the beginning of the policies section. However, it should also be mentioned in the Recognition section as well, otherwise the reader would only see that Hamas is acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side and would get only a partial picture, not in line with WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 12:36, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
? It is in the recognition section, per VR's version. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:53, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Where? This section in the current version of the article says nothing about Hamas's long term goals. Alaexis¿question? 21:22, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Alaexis Again, it is there per VR's version: In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto."[94] But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[117][44] @Corriebertus this is the agreed version that we have consensus for. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:32, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the answer. The problem is that in the beginning of this section it's said that Hamas is acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side, so to satisfy NPOV we need to move the long-term goals to the same paragraph. Our sources talk about both and both are important for the reader to get a holistic picture.
You can't say that this is the consensus version now that there are at least 2 editors who disagree with it. Alaexis¿question? 21:48, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
This is the version that had consensus to be put up, which I, alongside @Vice regent and @Smallangryplanet and yourself supported. It has nothing to do with satisfying NPOV, as the following line already notes the debate regarding the point of recognition: "Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated." The point about some scholars believing it retains its long-term objective is not relevant to include here to satisfy that. The reason it was placed there is exactly to ensure NPOV as the following Baconi source directly addresses that point. So if you start adjusting the order of that, the entire structure of the section is put into question, and you have reneged on your prior stated agreement to put up this version.
In your latest edit you further violated your own prior agreement with the VR version by removing parts you suddenly no longer appear to like. That is your right, but then we will have to proceed to a formal RfC on it. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:48, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I don't believe that I have ever supported this version. This is definitely not a consensus version.
A long-term goal to conquer all of the former Mandatory Palestine is hardly compatible with the future recognition so it makes sense to mention both viewpoints close to one another. Feel free to start an RfC. Alaexis¿question? 23:28, 27 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I see “It is in the recognition section”… but very low, only in the fourth paragraph, where 98% of the visitors will never get … (because that whole section is terribly unreadable. Totally chaotic. I understand that you guys have discussed that section for a very long time; apparently to no avail at all; why didn’t anybody in the last year endeavour to organize this fuzzy section?) Anyway, this is not what Alaexis has demanded from you, Smp. --Corriebertus (talk) 23:10, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Removing a trivial and therefore misleading sentence

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@Smallangryplanet: The starting sentence of section Hamas#Policies towards Israel and Palestine,
“Hamas' policy towards Israel has evolved”,
seems trivial and therefore misleading, therefore I’ve deleted it, with a CLEAR MOTIVATION, on 14 Feb 2025. Later that day this was reverted, without any motivation, by Smallangryplanet, who appears to be in the habit to revert edits that displease him, but without his own arguments, purely to force us to turn to this talk page ‘for consensus’. So here I am, again (see also the other talk section that I started, a few hours ago). Trivial, because it is normal and logical that through four decades, policies or statements will adapt in reaction to developments in the real world; that is the whole reason why we have that section entitled “Policies…” (= plural); so, there’s no need to state the obvious and repeat in the first sentence what the heading already tells. By stating that triviality anyway (“policy…has evolved”), we rouse the suggestion that the initial Hamas goal has been fundamentally changed; but that is not the case (and not shown in the section). So I’d say—as I said on 14 Feb—we should better remove this misleading, and redundant, starting sentence. I presume, Smp will now, at last, come up with his contra arguments? --Corriebertus (talk) 23:33, 21 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Corriebertus I am tired of discussing this in circles with you. WP:JUSTDONTLIKEIT is not justification for overriding prior hard-won consensus on this talk page – your extensive attempts to remove RS content on the page because you disagree with the conclusions the content comes to are really wearing thin. Given that the substance of the statement is critical to understanding the subject of the page and it is backed up by plenty of RS... regardless of your or my personal opinions or beliefs, it is worth keeping. You are in the discuss portion of the WP:BRD cycle. If people do not want to discuss it with you, or simply disagree and stop arguing, that does not give you permission to make this change. These sentences are referencing academic works written by reputed scholars published by an acclaimed academic press. Wikipedia user Corriebertus does not get to unilaterally decide what is and is not trivial; this website operates based on consensus, especially on contentious topics. I think at this point your only option is to make a formal RfC and go through that process in full. You know how I'll vote. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:54, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Can we archive that long discussion ('RfC...') ourselves, since it is 'closed' now?

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Can we archive that long discussion: 'RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section', ourselves? It was formally closed on 4 Feb, normally the auto-archiving bot should have had to archive it 15 days later (19 Feb), it is now 22 Feb.. --Corriebertus (talk) 20:19, 22 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Done. Alaexis¿question? 21:44, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Working ethics on article Hamas

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There seems to be a tendency going on, on article Hamas, of a few highly active editors, imposing their will on the article by sneaky edits (hiding a not-motivated high-impact edit behind a marginal but motivated edit); generally neglecting or refusing to directly give a good and clear motivation as regards content for their own rather sweeping edits (but instead alluding to some (vaguely or not identified) ‘consensus’ version); reverting well-motivated edits of colleagues without revealing any motivation from themselves, just to ‘force’ their ‘opponent’ to turn to the talk page ‘for a consensus’; abusing, disturbing or sabotaging talk page discussions by not reacting on the basic issue at stake but instead digressing to marginal or even off-topic (side) questions, resorting there to flagrantly false reasoning and when attacked on that point simply not answering again, or simply fleeing from a discussion when their argument is proven incorrect – just to use that same false argument (possibly) again in a later, new discussion slightly related to the former one.

Especially when a few editors are much more intensively working on Wikipedia than the average contributor, it is rather easy for them with a combination of forementioned modes of operation to dominate the article, effectively blocking the ‘democratic’ means of their ‘opposing’ contributors to change anything relevant in the article, even though those opponents deliver arguments and the blocking, preserving editors ‘deliver’ nothing but procedural barricades and (forementioned) tricks. This ‘blocking’ behaviour can only lead to Edit Wars, in which ofcourse the most time-intensive (full-time) contributors will always score the victory.

I propose the colleagues, to always give a clear motivation as regards content for any edits here; to not revert edits of others by only pointing at presumed or alleged formal/procedural grounds but always also by reacting on content; and in talk page discussions to react to the core issue and not only digress.

I’d like to hear a reaction at least from @Alaexis:, VR=@Vice regent:, @Smallangryplanet:, @Aquillion:. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:23, 23 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Corriebertus, apologies for the delayed answer, I've been a bit busy lately.
I agree with some of your points. I'm not a big fan of AE/ANI, so I'd prefer to run RfCs to try to resolve disagreements this way. Hopefully it'll help.
Please be aware there is a limit of 1,000 words per editor in formal discussions per WP:PIA. Alaexis¿question? 23:32, 27 February 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 2 March 2025

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The ancient Hebrew word Hamas from the old testament is translated as “violence”. Tperck (talk) 06:18, 2 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 07:17, 2 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]
It's an Arabic acronym so this does not appear to be any more relevant than it being a name for boys in Urdu. What might be interesting is if there is secondary source coverage of efforts to use the ancient Hebrew word and the old testament for social engineering of attitudes towards an enemy of Israel, but that would probably be something for a different article. Sean.hoyland (talk) 07:19, 2 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

RfC: Recognition of Israel section - due weight

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What weight should the following viewpoints be given in the Recognition of Israel section, in terms of prominence and proximity to each other? The latest round of the discussion can be found here but there were many related discussions and I believe that at this point we need external input.

  1. Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.
  2. Hamas accepted the 1967 borders in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side.

Options

Survey

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Discussion

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Hamas's long-term goals are not in question and are supported by multiple reliable sources

  • The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety[1]
  • In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas's original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible [2]
  • there is no doubt that ... Hamas is focused on ... destroying the 'Zionist entity'[3]

While this section addresses recognition in its narrow definition, it also discusses related topics such as Hamas's stance on the 1967 borders. Therefore, omitting their long-term goals would violate NPOV. Even sources generally sympathetic to Hamas acknowledge the dichotomy

Hamas has always oscillated between its attachment to the ‘historical solution’, which foresees the liberation of the whole of Palestine, and its capacity to recognize the validity of the ‘interim solution’, which prescribes the creation of a state with the 1967 borders[4]

There are no RS that dispute these long-term goals. On the other hand, the acceptance of the 1967 borders and "implicit recognition" are seen as a tactical move by some and as genuine by others. Therefore the long-term goals should be given greater weight. Alaexis¿question? 09:48, 2 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

(Invited by the bot) I don't have the depth of knowledge of this article to answer such a nuanced complex question. I started looking at it wanted to note one observation. In discussing a past, present or possible present objective of the destruction of Israel, instead of stating that directly this article uses complex obscure terms and terms of art to say that. Sincerely, North8000 (talk) 01:30, 3 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

References

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References

  1. ^ Alsoos, Imad (2021). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. S2CID 234860010. The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety
  2. ^ Burke, Paul; Elnakhala, Doaa'; Miller, Seumas (2021). Global Jihadist Terrorism: Terrorist Groups, Zones of Armed Conflict and National Counter-Terrorism Strategies. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 60–61. ISBN 1800371306. In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas's original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible
  3. ^ Bar-On, Tamir; Bale, Jeffrey M. (2024). Fighting the Last War: Confusion, Partisanship, and Alarmism in the Literature on the Radical Right. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 145. ISBN 1793639388. there is no doubt that ... Hamas is focused on ... destroying the 'Zionist entity'
  4. ^ Seurat, Leila (2022). THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HAMAS. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 20. ISBN 9781838607487.

Alaexis¿question? 09:21, 2 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]