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Codes

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The purple code and the JN codes were two different codes. This is often confused by historians. The purple code was simply the diplomatic code, and would have had nothing to do with the Japanese naval code. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.24.143.228 (talkcontribs) 05:18, 16 November 2006

The above is correct. Magic refers to the operation to decipher the PURPLE code, which was the diplomatic code. the JN-25 code was a different code and was deciphered by a different program than MAGIC. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.134.29.185 (talk) 22:37, 1 September 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Inclusion of the role of Major John Condon

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There is an unresolved dispute regarding the planning of Operation Vengeance with respect to the flight plan for the mission. In the accounts I've read and others I've heard, Major Condon, Operations Officer of Fighter Command, Solomon Islands, did draw up the flight plan in pilot kneepad format, which Mitchell then adjusted the next morning for changes in weather (windspeed) and to convert from nautical miles to statute miles, details which were common practice for the joint forces command.

I have read that Mitchell claimed to have created the flight plan after disregarding Condon's plan because it was illegible. Every sample I've seen of Condon's handwriting would seem to dispute this claim. Furthermore, Mitchell's claim was first delivered at a point late in his life.

Major Condon was officially credited with the planning of the operation, and received the Legion of Merit with Combat "V" for his service on Guadalcanal.

I have recently heard from one of the surviving pilots of Fighter Command that Mitchell's account in this regard was embellished. In this account, Major Condon, as Operations Office, "picked the planes" and "meticulously planned" the details of the flight including making two critical assumptions regarding the timing of the intercept.[1] Furthermore, the nature of the operation yielded no room for straying off course or any navigation by dead reckoning. According to this source "Johnny Condon was the man on Guadalcanal." (I will try to document this account properly. Until then, I will withhold the name and rank of the individual.)

Further sources would include R. Cargill Hall's "Lightning over Bouganville" which addresses the question in an interview with (then Major General, Ret) John P. Condon.

My suggestion is to omit the material until the dispute is resolved by definitive evidence.

[1] The two critical assumptions were that Admiral Yamamoto's Betty Bomber would 1) take off exactly on schedule, and 2) would be waxed and polished to a shine, thus decreasing drag and adding a slight bit to it's cruising airspeed.

24.130.57.233 (talk) 10:45, 25 August 2009 (UTC) Andrew Bertola[reply]

NTF131755

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I think it would be great to have a link to the original deciphered and translated text of the telegram NTF131755, but I have been looking all over and honestly have no idea how to find it. Does anyone know where this could be found online?--Lbr123 (talk) 23:57, 30 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Time Zones

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The times of Yamamoto's flight are explicitly given as Tokyo time. The times of the American intercept flight do not state a timezone. Are they expressed in Tokyo time? Local? Greenwich? All of the times should be in the same time zone, and explicitly state that timezone, so the readers can be clear on the time sequence. jdege (talk) 16:46, 17 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Timing

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Perhaps it should be noted that Yamamoto was always on-time at his destination, and the US knew this, which promped them to attack him in such a fashion. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.178.65.193 (talk) 01:33, 6 October 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Needs discussion of intelligence gains / losses debate

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This article could be significantly improved if it also captured the intense criticism that US forces and senior leadership got from the British in direct response to it. From the British perspective, this op significantly risked disclosing to the Japanese that the Allies were able to routinely decrypt and read their military cable traffic, since there really were very few other credible sources for Yamamoto's flight schedule / itinerary that the Allies might have relied upon. When I get more of a chance I will dig back through my textbooks... — Preceding unsigned comment added by Notonyourtintype (talkcontribs) 19:54, 30 May 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Rename article?

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I would suggest replacing "Operation Vengeance" with "Death of Isoroku Yamamoto" as the article name. While the former is pretty vague, the latter is much more straightforward and descriptive of the event. —Masterblooregard (talk) 02:17, 30 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

That seems reasonable to me. The basic facts around Yamamoto's death are well known to those who have even a passing interest in the Pacific War. Wheres the actual name of the operation is an obscure fact, to the point of almost being trivia - I certainly had no idea before reading the article. Therefore almost all seeking more information on the topic would be using search terms like "Yamamoto death", not "Operation Vengence". Furthermore "Death of Isoroku Yamamoto" feels like its more neutral - I'd feel certain that Japanese historians don't use the name 'Vengence' for the incident. Catsmeat (talk) 12:01, 3 January 2016 (UTC)[reply]
  • Oppose. The name of the operation is specific, is a common name, and is accurate. The article is also more about the military operation than the actual demise of the admiral: who took part, mission planning, and subsequent controversy over who shot down the plane. The details of the admiral's death is mostly unknown: his plane was shot down; his body was recovered in an odd position; there are dubious medical details. "Death of Isoroku Yamamoto" is generic rather than neutral and sounds more like a section heading in his bio. Somebody who is interested in what happened to the admiral can start with his article which should direct here for more detail. Glrx (talk) 20:25, 7 January 2016 (UTC)[reply]

In reference to Operation Vengeance and the successful intercept and shoot down of Yamamoto, I recall watching a history program detailing the planning, tactics, personnel, and aircraft to be employed. The one thing I will never forget was the code to be transmitted upon successful completion of the mission. The secret code was a simple four word verse taken from a well known childhood nursery rhyme, and very fitting for the circumstances. Those code words were " pop goes the weasel ". A fitting end to the planner of the Pearl Harbor attack.

bubbletop409Bubbletop409 (talk) 02:09, 8 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Derogatory claim deleted for no source; & Who shot cock robin?

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Article had inserted a derogatory claim about Lanphier having breached security on the radio, in a way that seemed to give fuel to the claim that Lanphier's claim of shooting down Yamamoto was false. Following the derogatory statement, article said: "Immediately on landing he put in a claim for shooting down Yamamoto." All of this was unsourced, no citation, no footnote. So I deleted the derogatory statement. Should the "put in a claim" be revised? Did Lanphier actually put in a claim, or is it that Lanphier filed a report in which he claimed the shootdown? (PeacePeace (talk) 19:25, 14 December 2019 (UTC))[reply]

I would imagine that in the military he would *have* to file a report in order to make a claim of any kind whatsoever. This being the special mission that it was, I would further imagine that he, and probably all the other pilots involved, would have to have filed a report of one sort or another. Hayford Peirce (talk) 21:49, 14 December 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Read the book Lightning Strike by Donald Davis. Lanphier's falsehoods are well documented there.2600:1700:7F11:6420:48B8:6321:EBC8:6D13 (talk) 04:09, 24 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Coastwatchers cover story

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Wasted Time R, thanks for taking out the coastwatchers bit given to newspapers. I agree it was just given to the airmen on Guadalcanal. Naturally, the idea of giving it to the airmen was to insure that, if they spoke to civilians or newspapers or even enemy agents, they would transmit the cover story.

The classic Get Yamamoto by Burke Davis in 1969 has nothing about newspapers getting the story. He writes on page 9, "'We shouldn't leave it to chance,' Layton said. 'Why not have all personnel involved briefed with a cover story? We could say it came from Australian coastwatchers around Rabaul. Everybody in the Pacific thinks they're miracle men."

Air Force Historical Research Agency historian R. Cargill Hall wrote in 1991's Lightning Over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered that the coastwatchers story was a cover fed to the pilots, and that coastwatchers had no actual role in the shootdown. He says there was widespread interservice gossip about codebreaking despite the cover story, and that it was a "minor miracle" that the Japanese did not figure it out. On page 198 he describes how the coastwatchers story was given to the pilots the night before, and that Yamamoto's name was mentioned during the briefing, confirming the Hughes source that we attribute. Binksternet (talk) 13:32, 15 September 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Did Mitchell receive the Navy Cross or Distinguished Service Cross?

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The article states his Medal of Honor recommendation was downgraded to a Navy Cross. The problem with this though is that he was neither in the Navy nor the Marines, which receive Navy Crosses instead of Distinguished Service Crosses. Seems to me like it should be the latter, as he was in the USAAF. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.254.18.190 (talkcontribs)

He got both the Navy Cross and the DFC![1][2] The Navy gave him the Navy Cross because the operation was originally a Navy idea, and the Navy supported it 100% even after the Army fliers were given the job. Binksternet (talk) 04:47, 11 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

"Self-managed death"

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I've just come across the suggestion that Yamamoto knew that the war was lost by early 1943, and "allowed the details of his planned visit .. to be broadcast in an ordinary fleet code" in the expectation that it would be deciphered. Supposedly, he saw dying in battle as better than suicide following inevitable failure.

It's very possible that they're wrong: the only cipher mentioned here used being JN-25D. Although that was the hardest to crack of the IJN's, success in doing so is credited with enabling the US to intercept and kill him. But was it also broadcast in another one? Lovingboth (talk) 20:40, 29 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]